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ABSTRACT 
This study examines critically recent research in the area 
of child language development, with an emphasis on research 
into semantic development. Various research articles, in 
particular, are analysed, with particular attention being 
given to experimental studies. In addition, research into 
language development in the naturalistic mode is discussed. 
The validity of research into language development in 
experimental contexts is questioned. Specific methods 
employed in experimental studies of language development are 
discussed critically. These methods are contrasted with 
methods used in a number of naturalistic studies. Recent 
research into semantic development is placed in the 
perspective of the study of semantics as a whole. 
The principal finding of this study is that research into 
languag~ development in artificial experimental settings 
does not allow for valid conclusions to be drawn. 
Naturalistic studies are preferred iM that they allow for 
language development, and semantic development in 
particular, to be placed in the context of overall child 
development. 
Language development is not able to be abstracted, for 
research p0rposes, from the totality of human development. 
Semantic development is viewed as a continuous process, 
lasting well into adulthood. The importance of the study of 
semantic development as part of semantics is emphasised. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The influence of Noam Chomsky on research into child 
language 
There has been rapid growth in the study of child 
1 anguage, over the 1 ast three dec.ades. Impetus for 
research has co~e from a number of sources, but one of 
the main influences appears to have been the writings 
of Noam Chomsky in linguistics. 
The publication of Chomsky's Syntactic Structures 
in 1957 introduced a rigorous mathematical formalism 
into linguistics. Chomsky laid down principles which 
he thought should govern the study of language, and 
grammar in particular. His Aspects of the Theory of 
Syntax (1965) developed the themes of his ~arlier ·book. 
Chomsky set out a theory of phonology in his joint work 
with Morris Halle, The Sound Pattern of English <1968). 
Chomsky has, however, not developed a theory of 
semantics in as much detail as his theories of syntax 
and phonology. 
Psychologists were already studying child language 
as a component of human behaviour when Chomsky's (1959> 
critique of B.F. Skinner's <1957> Verbal Behavior was 
published. Chomsky's debate with Skinner, a 
psychologist and proponent of behaviourism, enhanced 
the interest of researchers in child language. 
Psychologists such as Roger Brown and Dan Slobin became 
1 
involved more deeply in the study of child language and 
applied the existing tools of research psychology in 
their work. Thus children were tested in experimental 
·situations and their linguistic behaviour was analysed, 
usually with the aid of statistics. 
Chomsky suggested the topic of his wife's 
e.xperimental study on child language, The Acgui.sition 
of Syntax in Children from 5 to 10 <1969), the contents 
of which has proved a fruitful source for subsequent 
researchers. In his enlarged edition <1972> of 
Language and Mind, Chomsky makes an important statement 
on the relationship between linguistics and psychology: 
"I think there is more of a healthy ferment in 
cognitive psychology and in the particular branch of 
cognitive psychology known as linguistics - than there 
has been for many years" < 1972: 1 >. 
This statement would appea~ to have channelled the 
interest of researchers in psychology into the study of 
linguistics, and of child language in particular. 
Two years after Chomsky's 1972 ver·si on of Language 
and Mind was published, the Journal of Child Language 
came into being. It provided a forum for linguists and 
for psychologists interested in linguistics to publish 
their research into child language. Much of the 
~mportant research work on child language since 1974 is 
contained in this journal. Its articles on semantic 
development, for instance, cover most of the research 
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and bibliographies o+ research into the area of 
semantic development. Accordingly these articles form 
the bulk of the research material for this thesis. 
Consideration will also be given to research on 
semantic development in children which has been 
published elsewhere. The emphasis will be on a 
critical evaluation of the research methods that make 
use of structured tests. 
The scope of this thesis, then, is the study of 
published recent research into the development of 
semantics in child language, and the study of relevant 
articles in the Journal of Child Language in 
particular. The thesis will attempt to provide 
guidelines for further research into semantic 
development, but will not concentrate on an evaluation 
of dif+erent theories of semantic d~velopment, as much 
~valuation of these already exists, particularly in the 
work of Atkinson <1982> and of Elliot <1981). 
In brief, the chief influen~es on recent research 
into child language, and hence semantic development as 
part of this field appear to have been : 
(a) Noam Chomsky's theories, more particularly his 
views on +irst-language acquisition; 
(b) the aims of psychologists studying child language 
as part of human behaviour; 
<c> the work of linguists <often in conjunction with 
psychologists> with a special interest in child 
language. 
The view that linguistics is a branch of cognitive 
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psychology, as expressed by N. Chomsky <op. cit.), has 
exerted an influence on research methods employed in 
the study o~ child language. 
2. Recent research on child language 
Although mention will be made of research on child 
language prior to 1970, this thesis will concentrate on 
work published after that date, and on published 
experimental work in particular. The main sources that 
have been used to narrow down the field of study are : 
<a> most of the noteworthy ~esearch on child language 
listed in the bibliography in Elliot's book, 
Child Language <1981>; 
(b) articles in the Journal of Child Language <JCL) 
particularly those relevant to semantics; 
(c) ar·ticles in jour·nals other· than the JCL, such 
journals having gained mention either in Elliot 
(1981> or in the various references contained 
in the JCL; 
<d> chapters in books published since 1970 in which 
there is a critical discussion of research into 
semantic development in child language. 
Apar·t from the JCL, the periodicals that contain 
most of the relevant research for the purposes of this 
thesis are : the Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal 
Behavior· <JVLVB> , Wor·d, Chi 1 d Development, the Jour·nal 
of Psycholinguistic Resear·ch <JPR>, Cognition, the 
British Journal of Psychology, the Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology and the International 
Journal of Psycholinguistics. By far the most 
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relevant, however, are the JCL, the JVLVB and the JPR. 
Prior to the founding of the JCL <in 1974> most of 
the published research on child language was to be 
found in the JVLVB. Articles on child language had 
also appeared in various education, psychology and 
medical journals. It appears that the research methods 
reported in psychology journals, in particular, had a 
powerful in~luence on researchers into child language. 
The Journal of Psvcholinguistic Research was first 
published in 1972 and contains a number of articles on 
child language. The volume of published research on 
child language showed rapid growth after 1970. It 
would appear· that the JCL came into e:< i stence as a 
result of this growth. It is appropriate to take a 
close look at the founding aims of this periodical. 
The Journal of Child Language was first published 
in 1974, under the editorship o~ David Crystal. In his 
opening editorial, Crystal mentioned "thr·ee emphases in 
particular which we would like to see develop" 
(1974:(ii)). The firs~ of these was the need for the 
journal "to contain a regular proportion of papers on 
languages other than English" which would provide 
"testable or tested hypotheses" in respect of 
"linguistic universals of development••. The second 
emphasis would be on "a diversity of theoretical 
approaches to child language" since ther·e appeared to 
be a lack of freshness in the theoretical debate, with 
5 
6 
researchers taking up polar stances on the theoretical 
models <particularly generative theory>. The third 
emphasis would be on "methodological issues, which have 
tended to be neglected in recent work in linguistics". 
Such issue.s deserved attention in the study of child 
language "where the role of adult intuition is so 
debatable". Crystal also stressed the following: 
"Analytic criteria need to be fully explicit, if 
one is to evaluate claims about when a rule can be said 
to be 'acquired', for example, or to ensure that 
comparative and typological work is carried out 
consistently. We feel that questions of experimental 
design, evaluation, terminology and notation have been 
insufficiently aired in relation to the idiosyncrasies 
. 
of child language data, and we look forward to 
contributions concerning these matters'' (1974: <ii)). 
It has already been stated, in the first two 
sections of this chapter, that the research methods of 
psychology have influenced the methods of 
psycholinguists. The basic method of psychological 
research is the structured test <experiment or 
interview>, often carried out on a group or sample of 
subjects, as in Chomsky <1969), and usually accompanied 
by statistical analysis. While this thesis will not 
concern itself directly with a critique of the 
statistical aspects of tests of language development, 
it is appropriate to comment briefly on these, since 
they often f·or·m par·t of tests discussed both in the JCL 
and elsewhere. After the discussion of the merits of 
statistics in tests of language development, the main 
concerns of the thesis proper will be introduced. 
3. The use of stati s·t.i cal methods in tests of 1 anguage 
deve.1.opment 
The growth of mathematical statistics as a science 
since· 1950 also exerted a strong influence on all 
research involving measurement. Hypothesis-testing 
using statistical methods became very commonplace. 
Tests involving statistics enjoyed a wide use and 
acceptance in psychology. It is natural that child 
language researchers, many of whom are psychologists, 
should have adopted these tests. 
Statistics has provided useful decision-making 
tooLs in certain sciences, especially those in which 
there are standard units of measurement. In cer·tain 
areas of research into language, statistical methods 
have proved valuable: for example, in research into 
sound frequencies in phonetics. Human speech fa1ls into 
a certain segment of a frequency spectrum so that, in 
this field, the use of units of measurement <e.g. 
hertz> and techniques of sampling and testing do appear 
to have theoretical validity. In syntactic studies 
there are elements of predictability as regards word 
order and frequency of occurrence. Her·e, too, 
statistical methods may prove useful both descriptively 
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and inferentially. But it is in the area of semantics 
that the use of statistics appears to be the most 
questionable, for here the 'fuzziness' of the subject 
makes for difficult analysis. 
The use of statistical methods to make inferences 
about populations on the basis of samples is 
w-idespread. However, there is an element. of 
uncertainty involved in such procedures, as Mood and 
Graybill emphasise : , 
"There are two types of uncertainty with which we 
must contend : < 1 > uncertainty due to randomness and 
<2> uncertainty due to our ignorance of the true state 
of the system" <1950:1>. 
This uncertainty increases if the researchers who 
are using statistical methods do so without the 
assistance of a statistician. Very few research 
articles containing statistical tes.ts in the JCL, for 
instance, mention that any such assistance has been 
given. This practice is unfortunate for Cat least> two 
reasons first, the ~eader is left not knowing the 
extent to which the writer(s) of these articles 
satisfied themselves of the appropriateness of the 
tests which were used. The second reason is that 
writers of subsequent articles tend to be influenced by 
the degree to which reference to statistical advice is 
made by their predecessors. A lack of reference may 
tend to become accepted as the norm, to the detriment 
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of the overall research method. 
Many articles in the JCL include statistical tests 
on small numbers of children. This has the effect of 
weakening the evidence which the tests are supposed to 
provide. Large samples are in themselves no guarantee 
of· achieving satisfactory r·esults. They do, however, 
t.end to swing the argument in favour of the r·esearcher·, 
since they are an indicator of his overall 
thoroughness. The size of the sample varies with the 
type of statistic used in the test, but in most cases 
tests carried out with small samples <usually lower 
than 30> should be viewed very cautiously. 
One of the factors that reduces sample size is the 
difficulty of obtaining data from the sample of 
children originally selected. Children may be ill on 
the day of the test, or unavailable for a number of 
other· reasons. In some cases, the child may be unco-
operative or unresponsive. Children selected for 
testing longitudinally, i.e. over a specified time 
period, may move with their parents to a distant suburb 
or a different town. Parents may decide that they no 
longer wish their children to be tested. Thus, the 
sample size may reduce, even drastically, from the 
or·i gi nal. Researchers who have invested much time and 
effort may press on with the smaller sample, thus 
weakening their results. It would appear that the 
stated aim of the JCL of strengthening research 
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methodology has not necessarily been achieved in 
respect of the use of statistics. 
Sta·tistical analysis has nevertheless become 
establ i.shed as part of str·uctur·ed tests of 1 anguage 
d·eve.l.opme.nt <LD> • What is of more concern, in this 
thesis,. however, is the structured nature of th~ tests 
themselves.. This aspect wi 11 now be discussed, as it 
is crucial in any analysis of research into language· 
development. 
4. The main concerns of this thesis 
Against the background of the main influences on 
r·esear·ch into LD, and on its subsequent gr·owth, it is 
the central concern of this thesis to analyse 
~ritically the methods used in recent research in the 
field, and in semantic development in particular. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to show that 
structured tests of LD are essentially artificial in 
their design and execution and that, as such, are 
inappropriate and lacking in validity as indicators of 
LD, since LD is viewed essentially as a. natural 
process. 
The question of the use of statistics in tests of 
LD has already been discussed. It is claimed that this 
aspect of research into LD is over-emphasised and can 
potentially do more to weaken than to strengthen the 
researcher's case. In the chapters which follow, 
various aspects of the artificiality of LD tests will 
10 
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receive attention. It is claimed that the following 
aspects of LD tests are artificial and tend to be 
invalidating : 
(a). the environment and overall test design, including 
the durati.on of the test and the methods of 
r·ecording test data; 
(b) the· props and ma-ter· i a 1 s used in tests; 
<c > the language_ used in the design of test i terns. 
An intensive study will also be made of tests of 
relative clause acquisition, in order to exemplify how 
the artificiality of test situations tends to 
invalidate the results of these tests. 
As a foil to the methods used in structured 
<experimental> tests of LD, a number of naturalistic 
studies in semantic development will be analysed. A 
further hypothesis is that .these methods, being 
naturalistic, are concordant with the aim of obtaining 
knowledge about the way in which language develops in 
children. 
Finally, space will be devoted to a concluding 
comparison of the methods of the experimental and the 
naturalistic approaches, as well as to a consideration 
of the importanc& of the study of semantic development 
to the study of semantics as a whole. 
For ease of reference, the gender of the child, 
unless disambiguated by the context, will be taken as 
male. In much of the literature, children are studied 
with reference to their mothers, so that the latter 
convention allows for variety in the use of pronouns. 
The gender of the researcher will usually be clear from 
the context of the research under discussion. The 
gender of the writer <of an experimental research 
article> will usually also be assumed to be the gender 
of the "e~<pe.rimenter". 
A comment is in order concerning the notation 
followed by child language researchers in respect of 
the age of child subjects. Age is generally stated as: 
years; months. For example, an age of two years and 
seven months is written as 2;7. 
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Chapter· 2 
A DISCUSSION OF THE FACTORS IN TESTS OF LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT 
WHICH TEND TO DISTORT AND INVALIDATE THE RESULTS OF THESE 
TESTS 
In this chapter the question of the testing of 
children's language development i.n an artificial situation 
is discussed. It will b~ claimed that a number of factors 
are pres·ent in such situations which tend both to distort 
the results and to prevent a generalisation of the results 
to other situations, in which the children's daily routine 
c:an be contrasted to that of the test. Several of the tests 
under discussion involve semantic: development. 
Th~ situation of a test of language d~velopment is 
artificial in that it brings with it a number of non-routine 
features. In the first instance, it appears likely that the 
-
children being tested wilL feel a certain amount of anxiety: 
to a greater or lesser extent they will realise that they 
are being expected to render a performance for the benefit 
of the tester, who is usually a strange adult. Since the 
behaviour of children (like all humans> is context-dependent 
<Romaine, 1984:14>, it follows that experimenters need to 
be aware of the effects of the context of the test on the 
behaviour <linguistic: or otherwise> of the children being 
tested. 
The presence of a strange adult may influence a child 
to be less responsive than usual, or it may have the effect 
of making the child "show off" his knowledge. Not only does 
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an adult tester exercise influence as an observer, but as an 
adult he <or she> is likely to be perceived as an authority-
figtire by the child. The child's verbal responses are 
1 ike.l y to be modified because' there is an adult obser·ver· 
present. Thus the presence of an adult observer in itself 
acts to distort the observations which are being sought 
the. Observer's Paradox ref·erre.d t·o by Romaine < 1984: 16> in 
her discussion of method~ of testing. 
To circumvent the problem of his or her strangeness to 
the children being tested, it is a moderately common 
practice for an experimenter to spend a period of time 
familiarising himsel+ with the children. This is often done 
in the child's home, with the mother <and sometimes the 
father) present. There is a lack of consistency among 
researchers in respect of this practice: where it fails to 
gain mention in the literature, it is likely to have been 
omitted. It is unfortunate, in attempting to compare the 
+indings of di+ferent researchers, not to know whether they 
employed a period of familiarisation with their subjects. 
That a formal testing situation places a certain amount 
of strain on child subjects is evident from an analysis of a 
number of published research findings. Chambers and 
· Tavuchis <1976:66) refer to the strategy of incorporating 
questions of children's understanding of kinship in a game 
"in order to avoid putting the child into a traditional 
testing situation and to help maintain interest and 
attention''. Haviland and Clark (1974> emphasise the relaxed 
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and· in~ormal nature of their interviews with children. 
Thomson and Chapman <1977> report cases of children being 
dropped from a study because of their failure to participate 
consistently in a picture-labelling test, and even failing 
to respond at all. Tyler and Marslen-Wi~son (1978> tested 
chi l.dren using t.ape-recordi ngs made by a female reader· who 
read with a natural intona.ti on pattern. This strategy was 
apparently used to approximate to the child's hearing of his 
mother's voice. Once again, the extent to which different 
children show signs of anxiety is seldom emphasised in the 
literature, making inter-study comparisons difficult. 
·A number of researchers report that their child 
subjects became bored during tests. Kuczaj and Lederber·g 
<1977:407> mention the case of one child (in a group of 45 
being tested for their comprehension of the words younger 
and older> who "became so bored with the situation that two 
sessi.ons on different days were required''. The particular 
test consisted of first showing the child 16 pairs of 
objects and asking him three questions about each pair, then 
following this with more questions about another four pairs 
of objects. Since some of the children being tested were 
only four years old, a series of well over 50 questions 
would be likely to lead to difficulties in obtaining 
responses. Chambers and Tavuchis report in their research 
on the understanding of kinship that children aged about 6;0 
were 
"reasonably attentive and co-oper·ative, although still 
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prone to making errors dr becoming distracted'' (1976:65>. 
It does not appear that the effects of test-induced 
boredom on the results obtained. in studies of language 
development have been adequately researched. Certainly, 
there, is wide variation in the duration of tests 
administered to children of a given age~ For a group of 
two-year olds, the work of Thomson and Chapman (1977> 
reve.al s that. test.i ng sessi ens had to be terminated after· 
half an hour to an hour, owing to the child's becoming 
tired. Fremgen and Fay (1980> tested 16 children in the 
children's own homes, in a single session lasting 45 
minutes. These children were aged between 1;2 and 2;2. 
McDonald and Pien <1982> report on a 30-minute session with 
mother-child pairs where the children were aged 2;5 to 3;0. 
One of the subjects became restless after 25 minut~s. 
Angiolillo and Goldin-Meadow <1982> administered a test 
lasting 1 1/2- 2 hours to children aged 2;4- 2;11 1/2. 
Apart from these studies, there have been cases where 
children have been dropped from a research group, often with 
no ~eason given. It seems likely that many children at the 
younger ages are not able to concentrate for more than 30 
minutes in this type of test situation. A glaring omission 
from a large number of tests of language development is any 
statement of the average duration of the test. If 
researchers are finding that certain. types of test become 
problematic because of the children's short attention span, 
then it would seem that this difficulty must surely be 
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W·idespread. An attempt needs to be made by researchers to 
set age-related time limits for structured tests, in the 
light o~ what current experience has revealed about the 
attention-span of children. 
In s,tudies invol.vi.ng the naturalistic: observation of 
children, the time factor does not appear· to be as 
i.mp·ortant., presumably because the chi 1 dren can transfer from 
one typa of activity to another when it suits them. Also, 
in na.tura.l istic: st.udi es mothers are normally present, so the 
child tends to follow his daily routine, which acts as a 
reassuri.ng factor. 
In general, most of the tests of language development 
cited in the literature do not last longer than two hours. 
Whether or not a time limit is an accurate reflection of the 
actual time spent in each case, is not really clear. There 
is a large element of vagueness in time-reporting as well, 
with the phrase "one to two hours" being used frequently. 
This is indicative of a weak method: greater accuracy is 
needed in recording the actual duration of tests. 
A further question which needs to be addressed in 
research methodology is that of the physical environment of 
the test. This c:.an vary considerably: in some cases the 
child's home is used, but usually it is more convenient to 
test children in a school Cor nursery school> environment. 
By workin~ in the latter environment, a tester is able to 
test a large number of children in a comparatively short 
time. The children are familiar with the school environment 
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and, to this extent, it is a natural one for them. 
Nevertheless, children realise that the test. is in some way 
"special". and it would seem that this consciousness on their 
part may have a bearing on the outcome. It is instructive 
to e~amine a number of different testing environments and to 
c.ompare them cri ti call y. 
Coker <1978) refers to individual testing of: children 
as part of a study of syntactic and semantic factors in the 
acquis.ition of before and after. Children aged between 5;3 
to 7; 7 wer·e tested in "a mob i 1 e 1 aboratory for one or two 
sessions of about twenty minutes each. After every six to 
eight trials the child was given the choice to continue or 
not." The strangeness of the mobile laboratory could have 
had an inhibiting effect on the responses of children who 
were tested in this way. The novelty of the environment 
would capture the child's interest and would hold potential 
for distraction from the subject-matter of the test itself. 
In another series of tests, Tyler and Marslen- Wilson 
<Q.e.. cit.) carried out exper·imental sessions lasting twenty 
minutes, with the children wearing headphones and being 
tested individually in a quiet room. These children were in 
three groups of ten aged, on average, five, seven and ~leven 
respectively. The older children would probably not view 
this situation as being as strange as the youngest group 
would. The tests in question dealt with sentence processing 
and memory. Apart from differences arising on account of 
older children having more experience of sentence 
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processing., it is arguable that the greater ~aturity of the 
older group would improve their chances of concentration on 
the task at hand, under these conditions. The age factor 
alone should not be seen by the resear·cher as t.he main 
dif·ference- among the three- groups : the fact that the 
younger· groups may find the physi.cal condi ti.ons of the test 
more distracting than the older group could have a bearing 
on the outcome. If this were so, then the test would not, 
in eff·ect, be the same for the three groups. 
Another investigation in which a quiet room was used 
was carried out· by Emerson < 1980) • ln this case, children 
were tested indi.vidually in the spare room of a school. 
These children, being five years and older, would be likely 
t.o have at 1 east seen this room or to have known of its 
existence. But it would nevertheless be somewhat str·ange 
and its use could influence the children's responses. 
Feagans (1980) used a quiet room of a school and Norlin 
<1981> used quiet and well-lighted rooms of schools. 
Johnston (1984) used small rooms in a nursery school. It 
appears that many interviews and tests are carried out in 
quiet rooms of nursery and other schools, whereas, for most 
children, the nursery school is a place where activity takes 
place in noisy and often crowded rooms. By taking children 
out o+ their normal playrooms into a quiet room, often 
containing strange equipment, the interviewer is introducing 
+actors into his test which could distort the data which is 
obtained. 
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Taking a different approach, Golinkoff and Markessini 
<1980> tested five groups of six children aged 1;7 to 5;5. 
The children's mothers were used to help with the test, 
whi.ch was performed in a sma.l.l room with toys and child-size 
furniture <table and chairs). The presence of their 
mothers, as well as toys and more familiar furniture could 
lead to more natural responses from the children being 
tested. McDonald and Pien <1982) also used mother-child 
pairs - in this case the children were aged 2;5 to 3;0 - and 
carried out their observations in a carpeted playroom with 
one-way mirrors. Also in this vein, Corrigan and Odya-Weiss 
<1985) recorded 48 two-year olds on videotape in a playroom 
with a small table and chair, with one or both of the 
child's parents present. The use of parents during a test 
makes for a more natural environment, besides which the 
parents have extensive experience in communicating with 
their child and can therefore assist the tester to put ideas 
to the children and interpret their response. The presence 
of one or more parents during research into language 
development has become more commonplace in r·ecent times. 
It is instructive to examine the influences of other 
aspects of the test environment, viz. recording devices of 
the audio or video variety. In the earlier work on language 
development, during the period between 1960 and 1980, 
extensive use was made of tape-recorders. Insofar as it is 
not part of a child's everyday routine to have his speech 
recorded - in fact many children would regard such an event 
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.as unusual - it could have the effect of making children 
"show-off'' in their speech. The excitement caused by .the 
novelty of the recorder could also distract the children 
from the questions being put to them by the interviewer. 
The novelty of a tape-recorder would be diminished if the 
children being tested were allowed to familiarise themselves 
in advance with the experience of having their speech 
recorded. This does not appear to be done very often, 
however. 
In one case cited in the literature <Johnston, 1984>, 
children of mean age 5;2 undergo tests lasting an hour, on a 
once-off basis, with a table microphone being placed one 
foot to one and a half feet from the child. In a long test 
of this nature, in a strange situation, it would seem that 
the children being tested would be likely to become 
distra~ted by the presence of the microphone. 
Although many researchers, like Coker <1978), Emslie 
and Stevenson <1981) and Howe <1981>, use tape-recorders, it 
is not clear in a large number of other studies whether a 
recorder has been used. It seems desirable that a 
researcher should always report on this aspect of his work, 
so that more comparative data could be assembled. The 
com~ents made on tape-recorders would also be applicable to 
video-recorders, possibly even more so. Because of the 
expense involved in the use of the latter, their occurrence 
in the literature is infre~uent, however. Rodgon et al 
<1977) report on children being unobtrusively videotaped <my 
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empha.si s>. 
Gordon Wells, by way of contrast, decided to 
incorporate a. tape-recorder into a. child's daily routine to 
a.llo~ for naturalistic: observations of speech. A radio 
microphone was strapped inside the child's clothes and it 
was~ 1 i ght enough for the c:hi 1 d to c:a.rry about. Wells 
describes his method as follows: 
"Tha recordings were made in the homes of the children 
by means o~ a. radio-microphone linked to a battery-operated 
ta.pe-recor~er, controlled by a. pre-set programme to switch 
on for short periods at intervals over a whole day. This 
technique makes it possible to c:ollec:t samples of 
spontaneous speech whic:h reflect the child's natural 
interaction with the environment, uncontaminated by the 
presence of an observer. Contextual information was 
obtained by ~eplaying the tape to the mother in the evening. 
of the same day and asking questions about the locale, 
participants and activity in ea.c:h recorded per·iod" 
( 197 4 :. 256) • 
This method c:ould not be used equally easily by all 
researchers; however, it does highlight the importance of 
obtai.ning natural speech from the c:hild. The implications 
for structured tests would seem to be that the observer 
should be as unobtrusive as possible, and that all recording 
devices should be kept out of the way. There are now 
minature tape-recorders whic:h c:an easily be hidden from the 
child's view, and these should be used when recording is 
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necessary. Large video cameras should be concealed, either 
behind a partition or in an adjoining room, if a laboratory 
is avai l.abl e. 
ln the more recent research, a number of methods of 
screening children prior to tests of language development 
ar·e repor·ted. Johnston < 1984·> screened a gr·oup of children 
with respect to their hearing and speech intelligibility. 
Conner and Chapman <1985) mention that the children were 
screened for sensory and cognitive functioning and that only 
children who were within normal limits were tested. These 
researchers also report <1985:116> on the ehildren's 
"growing tr·ust" in the instructions of the investigator. 
Norlin (1981) employed screening techniques; among which was 
a hearing test. A number of other researchers mention that 
children failed the initial stages and were then dropped 
from the test. The extent to which children perform poorly 
on tests of this nature because of hearing defects or 
cognitive problems is still unknown, because of the lack of 
reported research. in this area. 
So far, a number of factors relating to method have 
been cited as being problematical in research into language 
development. It is instructive to examine critically the 
methods used in a particular research study, bearing these 
previously mentioned factors in mind. The research to be 
discussed was carried out by Haviland and Clark. The 
authors studied the acquisition of English kin terms and 
sought to elicit definitions for 15 of these, using an 
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interview procedure "modelled on that of Piaget" <1974:36). 
Their aim was to interview 50 children between the ages of 
3;0 and 8;10. However, only 30 complete protocols were 
obtained, +rom children between the ages of 3;5 and 8;10. 
The authors do not shed much light on the reasons for the 
other 20 protocols not being complete, and one is left to 
speculate· •. The interview method is described as follows: 
II the first author interviewed 50 children ranging 
in age ~rom 3;0 to 8;10, from_the Bing Nursery School~ 
Stanford. The interview procedure was modelled on that of 
Piaget <1928). The children were asked 'What is a mother?', 
'What is an uncle?' etc., until definitions had been 
elicited for all 15 kin terms covered by this study <mother, 
father, grandmother, grandfather, son, daughter, grandson, 
granddaughter, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew 
and cousin). To control for any possible sequential 
effects, the order in which kin terms were asked for by the 
intervi.ewer was varied by using 12 different permutations of 
\ 
the 15 terms" <1974:36-7>. 
The interviews were carried out in a quiet corner of 
the classroom and were relaxed and informal. Whenever 
possible, the interviewer tried to elicit further 
information from the child by aski.ng additional questions, 
such as: 
'Do you have an uncle?' 
'What do you have to have to be a sister?' 
The entire exchange was recorded by the interviewer on 
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a specially prepared interview shee.t <1974:37>. The authors 
repor-t signs of bor-edom among the younger- children "after 
the inter-viewer had gone through only four or five kin 
ter-ms", in which case the chi 1 d was all owed to r·est and, if 
still unco-opera.tive· after his res·t, was allowed to continue 
"a f;ew, days 1 a-ter-" < 1974: 37>. 
The. authors do not specify how many of the younger 
chi l.dren wer-e af-fected in this way. However·, the fact that 
no complete protocols were obtained from children in the 
range 3;0 to 314 years suggests that the concentration of 
incomplete protoct:lls .was at. the lower end of the age scale. 
Th~ children who were allowed to rest could have done so for 
varying time-intervals, which would make comparisons between 
the results of differ-ent groups difficult. Also, the 
authors are vague as to the number of children who actually 
repeated the test after a few days. It would also be useful 
to know just how many days elapsed between test and re-test 
sessions : this, too, is not specified by the authors. 
The study by Haviland and Clark cited above will now be 
ct:lntrasted with research carried out by Armbuster <1981). 
Armbuster carried out structured tests similar to those 
performed by Carol Chomsky (1969). He tested 28 children 
aged 5;5 to 6;4 and was careful to mention the details of 
his research method as well as his concern lest his method 
was incorrect. He displays his sensitivity in the test 
situation by placing the child to be tested at ease. He 
ensured that he was familiar with each of the children, 
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having seen them on an occasion prior to the test. He 
tested the children individually; each child came to be 
tested when ready to do so, and there was no compulsion as 
regards t·he t·est. He. states < 1981:31 > that: 
"The sessi c;~ns 1 as.ted about 5 mi nu.tes, and were 
conducted in fami 1 i ar surr·oundi ngs11 • 
Moreover, he mentions the c.are he took during the test 
itself to mai.ntai.n a rel axe.d atmospher·e which would be 
c:cnducii. v.e to .na·tural .respons-es .on the par.t of .the .,c.hi 1 d .. : 
uwhen the child entered the room, he saw me sitting on the 
rug with the equipment. I asked him to sit down, and 
brought out Kathy. As did Chomsky, I tried to proceed 
'+airly casually and in a conversational manner' (Chomsky, 
1969, p.27>. The goal was to find out about each child's 
lingui.stic knowledge. Enc.ountered here is the classic 
problem of linguistic +ieldwork. To perform sys~ematic 
analysis, systematic data are needed. But the most 
interesting type of speech is natural speech, unmolded by 
inhibitions and af+ectations brought on by an artificial 
interview or experiment situation. So 1 tried hard to sound 
-
relaxed and informal, while keeping to my schedule of 
questions" <1981:31-2>. 
It is interesting that the Journal of Psvcholinguistic 
Research, in which Armbuster's research is published, 
contains few articles in which a detailed account of the 
setting and the duration of the test<s> are mentioned. Just 
as in the case of the Journal of Child Language, most 
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detai 1 s of me.thod are omitted. In fact, Keil <1980> writing 
nine years after the Journal of Psvcholinguistic Research 
had commenced publication, is one of the first researchers 
to give details of method. Keil appears, however, unaware 
of the problems inherent in long tests. In a test 
admi ni s.ter·ed to groups of lst, 3rd, 5th and 8th grader·s, he 
s;t·a·tes baldly that t·esting sessions lasted from 30 minutes· 
to 1 1/2 hours "dependi.ng on the ski 11 and tractabi 1 i ty of 
the child'' (1980~225>. Keil also does not expand on his 
statement <1980:225> that "standard uninformative prompts 
were used for the occasional unresponsive child''. Just how 
many ~hildren were unresponsive is not clear; however, he 
does state that the test proved too long for four of the 
children to complete in one session and also that one first 
grader was dropped +rom the study because he could only 
manage a giggle as his response! 
Some researchers writing in the Journal of 
Psycholinguistic Re.search do give interesting details 
regarding the physical setting of the test. Feagans (1980) 
mentions that the children sat at a low table in the 
experimental room and the experimenter sat across the table 
from the child. In similar vein, Barrie-Blackley <1973:161) 
relates that in the case of each subject CS) being tested, 
"The S was seated in an adult-sized chair, at eye-level 
. 
with the examiner, who was seated in a child-sized chair". 
The venue of the test was rather unusual in this case, being 
the hallway outside the child's classroom. 
The researchers Hargrove and Panagos <1982> discuss an 
experimental session which was held ''in a distraction-free 
room a,t a local college. This session lasted about 20 
minutes to a half hour. .A videotape camera, situated in 
~rent of the child at a distance of approximately 2 metres 
<6 fe.et> was used. to record re.sponses. Seated at a table 
next· t·.o t.he e:<perimente.r, the child was directed to act out 
the enactment sentences. It was noted that some of the 
sentences might sound '+unny' but that an e+fort should be 
made to act them out anyway" (1982:221>. 
Just as in other research cited previously, the 
presence of a videotape camera could constitute a 
distraction to tha child being tested. Especially 
interesting here is the fact that the child is asked to act 
out responses to sentences in front of a camera, while 
seated. It may be that the children in. question did not 
exaggerate their responses in this situation. However, the 
requirements of the test would seem to be conducive to some 
exaggeration, which would distort the results. 
Further evidence of the effects of test duration on the 
performance of children is given by Brener <1983:240). In a 
90-item comprehension test given to children of ages 2;8 to 
5;7, it was decided that the youngest children should 
undergo a number of sessions on succeeding days. The older 
children were asked to do the test in one session, but it 
was broken up into three parts: 
"To minimize the effects of fatigue there were two 10-
28 
minute breaks during the session'' <1983:240>. 
Hladik and Edwards <1984:324> also provide ~or the 
possibility of unreliable test data by filtering out certain 
sec.t·i ons thereof: 
"ln ord·er to control for possible warm-up and fatigue 
f·actors ,. the f·i.rst and 1 ast 5 minutes of each 30-mi nute 
samp·le· we.re deleted from analysis ••• " 
Although this process of data selection would seem to 
have· merit, it is not common pr·actice among researcher·s i.nto 
chi 1-d langu.age. A larg.e number of tests do have a p.r.e-test 
session, but the data of the test itself is usually analysed 
as a whole. Further discussion therefore seems necessary on 
the issue of whether the so-called warm-up and fatigue 
factors should be allowed for, and, if so, to what degree. 
Finally, research by Staley < 1982> mentions a number· of 
points which are germane to the question of testing children 
in experimental situations: 
"At each of four age levels, 10 subjects were male and 
10 were female. In order to reduce sex bias, exactly half 
the interviews were conducted by a male interviewer and half 
by a female inter·viewer" <1982: 143). It has been argued that 
child subjects may possibly show higher levels of linguistic 
performance on tests where the interviewer is female. 
Alternatively, girl subjects may r·espond more favourably to 
female interviewers than boy subjects do. This could lead 
to generalisations such as "Girls ar·e better at language 
than boys" or· "Gir·ls acquire language more rapidly than 
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boys" <my examples>. 
Staley <1982> goes on to describe the research: 
"Each interview was preceded by a brief rapport-
building conversation bet.ween in.tervi ewer and subject about 
a limited number of topics, usually about school, teachers, 
lunch, etc. Although it was impossible to standardize the 
content of these conversations, this was thought to be a 
necessary inclt:tsion, because of the potential anxiety 
produced by the interview situation~ Evidently some 
children did find the situation threatening, since four 
females at the 4-year-old age level refused to participate 
and had to be replaced" <1982:143>. 
The effects which factors l.ike the sex of the 
interviewer and the anxiety level of the child have on the 
results of tests of child language development require to be 
researched. in greater detail. It is only when more is known 
about factors such as these that cont~olled tests can be 
compared with confidence. 
In this chapter, a number of articles on child language 
development have been examined. Most of these articles have 
appeared in the two main journals in the field, namel~ the 
Journal of Child Language and the Journal of 
Pyschol i ngui sti c Research.. The pur·pose of the chapter was 
to .show that a number of factors are present in child 
language tes~s which render the results of such tests 
suspect, or, in any event, prevent the generalisation of the 
results to other contexts. 
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Br i e.f 1 y, the main factors involved are: 
<1> A presence of a relatively strange interviewer. 
<2> A test situation which is artificial. 
<3> Potentially distracting apparatus, like tape-recorders, 
videotape cameras and notebooks. 
<4> Fatigue and boredom induced by lengthy test sessions. 
(5) A lack of uniformity in duration of tests, with respect 
t-o the age of the subjects. 
(6) Anxiety experienced by child subjects. 
<7> The absence of the child's mother, especially in the 
case of very young children. 
<B> The effects of the gender of the interviewer on the 
responses of the child subjects~ 
(9) The period of familiarisation allowed for the child.to 
get to know the interviewer. 
ln the articl.es which have been examined in this 
chapter, there is a distinct lack of ~niformity of method. 
Standards of testing practice do not appear to have been 
formulated. This is a disappointing f~ature of the research 
published in the Journal of Child Language especially, since 
one of the founding aims of the JCL was to refine the 
methods being used in research into child language. It 
appears that researchers into child language in situations 
of· e!<periments or tests actually have the worst of both 
worlds~ in the first place their results are obtained in an 
artificial situation, while in the second, a lack of uniform 
controls and test practices makes it very difficult to 
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c~mpare th~ results o~ one test with another. 
Chapter 3 
INFLUENCES OF AN ARTIFICIAL TEST SITUATION ON THE OUTCOMES 
OF TESTS OF SEMANTIC DEVELOPMENT 
In the previous chapter, there was a critical 
discussion of the factors present in tests of LD which tend 
t·o render such tests i nva-1 i d. The purpose of this chapter 
is to anal.yse a number of materials and procedures used in 
tests of LD. The main hypothesis herein is that the use of 
toys, models and contrived situations is inappropr-iate to 
the study of semantic development. 
In tests of semantic development administered to 
children, it would appear to be important that, while 
preliminaries to the tes~ may be light-hearted, the 
materials of the test itself should be realistic. The 
rationale behind this argument is that, if children are 
tested in situations which differ markedly from those of 
real life, then the results of the tests could only be used 
to reach conclusions about the meanings children attach to 
words in a context of fantasy. 
It is important to examine the role of toys or models 
in language testing, particularly the perception that a 
child may have of the toy <model> and the ext~nt to which 
adult testers and interviewers overtly recognise that toys 
and models are mere symbols. To illustrate this, one needs 
to examine the following example : a child playing with a 
toy in the form of a female human being refers to the toy, 
let us say, as lady. He does this because of the similar·ity 
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he perceives between the toy and an adult female. If on the 
other hand, suppose that he is given a toy elephant, but has 
never seen a real elephant, he would presumably not attach 
the same meaning to the word elephant, used to designate the 
t~oy, as would someone who had seen a real elephant. 
In this chapter, a number of tests of semantic 
development will be discussed critically, with the foregoing 
distinction in mind. rt wi 11 be ar·gued that, in many cases, 
t·he make-believe nature of the test situation does not allow 
one to extrapolate test results to realistic situations. 
Some games used in the administration of tests 
incorporate more make-believe than others. Where a game is 
merely a relaxed way of introducing a child into a situation 
in which language is used naturally, there might be merit in 
such an approach. However, when a game situation, including 
the materials and the models used in the game, bears little 
resemblance to that which the child is likely to encounter 
in his everyday life, then the test carried out may have 
questionable validity. 
In this chapter there will be a discussion of tests of 
semantic development with reference to the reality of the 
test situation. The first of these is a test carried out by 
Donaldson and McGarrigle <1974> and is reported in an 
article entitled "Some clues to the natur·e of semantic 
development" in the first issue of the JCL. In this article 
the authors set out to study comprehension of the 
quantifiers all and !!l9.!:..§. by children between the ages of 
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three and five. The authors introduce their study as 
follows: 
"Consider the situation in which a statement has to be 
compared with a physical array and judged true or false in 
relation to that array. In such a situation, since 
statements do not ordinarily describe exhaustively, there 
are properties of the physical array which are irrelevant to 
the making of the judgment;. that is, changes in these 
properties do not change the judgment. The properties which 
a given subject actually treats as irrelevant provide 
evidence about the meaning of the statement for that 
subject" <1974:185>. 
What the authors do not mention here is that statements 
which re.fer to a physical array are different from 
statements which refer to •odels of a physical array. In 
the case of statements which refer to a model, instead of to 
the entity which the model represents, the properties of the 
model itself may affect the interpretation (and hence the 
comprehension> of such statements by the listener. A person 
who hears, for example, the statement: This elephant has big 
~ arguably attaches a different interpretation to the 
statement depending on whether the reference is to a toy 
elephant, a photograph of an elephant or an actual elephant. 
Donaldson and McGarrigle argue that, in statements of 
the form, "'All the Xs are in/on place Y"', the attributes 
of X and Y do not affect the truth of the utterance, apart 
from "the possibility of some uncertainty about the 
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boundaries of Y" <1974:185>. They state that: "It would not 
matter in the least, for instance, whether the place Y was a 
container or an open surface - whether it was a box or a 
+ield or a city•• <1974:185>. The authors were interested to 
know why chi 1 dren unde.r the age of five held the utterance: 
'ALl the cars are in the garages' to be true in the 
s:tt·uat.ion where· each garage cont.ained a car and there was 
also a car "sitt.ing in full view outside" <1974: 185-6). 
Such an i nterpret.ation was not found in the case of a 
statement like: 
All the lids are on the pots 
rn the case of the latter, it was held to be true only 
i+ the numbers of lids and pots were equal. 
The test material used by the researchers is described 
below, and an illustration of their material is also 
reproduced: 
"The material consisted of nine toy cars and ten toy 
garages. Each garage could hold only one car. The garages 
were joined at their sides so as to make two separate garage 
structures, one with spaces for six cars and the other with 
spaces for four cars. The garages were without doors so 
that the cars were visible to the child even when garaged, 
and also without floors so that the garages could easily be 
placed over the cars or lifted away from them. 
Display shelves were constructed so that one subset of 
the cars and its garage structure could be placed above the 
other. The top and bottom shelves were identical in 
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appearance. The garages could be positioned or removed by 
th~ experimenter from behind the shelves. A typical display 
is shown in Fig .• 1. 
Fig. 1. A typical array, showing cars <Xs> and garages in 
positi~n on the shelves" <1974:186-7). 
Fig. 1 
The experimenters do not stress the fact that the 
garage models are actually substantially different from real 
garages, in that they lack doors and floors. There is also 
no indication in the research that the e~perimenters sought 
to establish whether the child subjects could differentiate 
between a single model garage and a garage structure. In 
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fact, the latter ambiguity is evident from an e:<tract from 
the authors' PROCEDURE section: 
11 <The e:<perimenter puts both garages on the table.> 
What are these called'? <indicating the garages> Right. 
These are the garages" < 1974·: 187>. 
However, it is c:.l.ear that by garages the experimenter 
is ac.tual.ly re.ferring to g·arag.e structures. This is tr·ue 
both of his stage directions and of his actual words to the 
children being tested.. It coul-d be argued that this 
ambiguity alone vitiates the r·esearc:h because· of the cr·uc:ial 
importance of differentiating. between a single garage and a 
garage structure <of four or six joined garages). After 
all, the subjects would presumably have already e:<perienc:ed 
the term garage being used to refer to a single structure 
and not to a row of joined garages. 
But there are other problems with this research study. 
The fact that the garages are moved away from the cars <and 
not, as a rule, vice versa> lends an unreal flavour to the 
whole situation. Not only is the child being asked to 
interpret statements which contain quantifiers,but he.is 
also required to do so with models of physical objects whose 
resemblance to the real thing is weak. Also, the fact that 
garages are not only i.n rows, but tiered <on shelves> is a 
further source of potential confusion for the child. He may 
not be familiar with such multiple garage arrangements, 
especially in ~hree dimensions! An element of spatial 
perception testing, in addition to pure linguistic: testing, 
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is being introduced. 
For the crux of the test, the procedure was as follows: 
"For all of the judgme.nt·s the child was faced with a 
line of five cars on one shelf and four on the other. The 
c.ars were arranged so that the garages could be positioned 
without disturbing the cars. The +our-space garage, when 
present~ was always full; the six-sp•ce garage always placed 
i.n vertical one-to-one corr·espondence which began on the 
le~t-hand side of the display, so that the extra one car 
<and one garage space> always appeared on the r·i ght, as 
viewed by the subject. The child was asked six questions, 
four involving all and two involving ~· For the !!lQ!.:.g 
judgments the child was asked: 
Are there more cars on this shelf or more cars on this 
shelf? 
with the experimenter pointing appropriately. The same 
question was then repeated, the garages having been either 
removed or placed in position. For the ~ questions the 
child was asked: 
Are all the cars on this shelf? 
for each shelf successively, with the experimenter again 
pointing to the intended r·eferents. The two all questions 
were then repeated, the garages having been either removed 
or placed in position. The child completed all the 
judgments for one type of question (i.e. either all or ~> 
with garages both present and absent, before receiving 
questions of the second type" (1974=188>. 
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It is interesting to note, in this description, that 
the writers refer to "one garage space". Nowhere in their 
description of their preliminary conversations with the 
child subjects do they refer to a. "garage space", presumably 
bec.ause this te.r·m is a complicated one for a child to 
unders-tand. When they say to the children: 
"Righ.t. These are the garages" <187> it is· not clear 
whether they are pointing to individual garages <i.e. garage 
spaces> or g·arage structures. It would appear that the term 
gacages may be ambiguous to the childrenr it could be taken 
to mean either "more than one garage <space>" or "more than 
one garage structure". As pointed out earlier, this lack of 
clarity of meaning weakens the test substantially. 
Another problem arises with the phrasing of the 
questi.on: 
Are there more cars on this shelf or more cars on this 
shelf-'? 
The purely linguistic "correct" answer is this shelf so that 
th~ child would have to gesture appropriately as.well. 
However, since the phrase this shelf may be used first to 
refer to the shel+ with fewer cars <the top shelf>, it is 
possible that the child could point, incorrectly, to the top 
shelf partly because its label happens to be correct. This 
problem could be overcome by phrasing the question thus: 
Which shelf has more cars? or even 
Which shelf has more cars on it? 
Since the child is likely to use a gesture in order to 
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answer the original question correctly, he would also be 
able to do so in the case of the suggested amended 
questions. He would not, however, be able to latch on to a 
linguisti.c 'clue' if the lat.ter two questions were used. 
Another point that the writers do not mention, albeit a 
minor one, is that their ~.questions actually contain two 
"·mores". This is rather awkward stylistically and would 
pr·esumabl y be defended by the authors on the grounds that it 
is mor~ neutral than saying: 
Are ther·e more cars on this shelf? 
and then pointing to one of the shelves. If one were to ask 
the latter question and point to the shelf with five cars, 
it could be construed as giving the child a clue as to the 
correct answer. However, the fact that the test question 
contains a 'double' ~ is significant. It means that a 
slightly different. test from that originally envisaged by 
the writers is being performed. It is also possible that 
some children could find the question confusing. In normal 
adult usage part of this question would be deleted: 
Are there more cars on this shelf or on this shelf? 
In their analysis of the results of this test for the 
quest i ens i nvol vi ng ~. the authors found that 21 chi 1 dr·en 
answered correctly and consistently, and five children 
consistently gave incorrect answers. The other· 14 children: 
"changed their choice of subset when the garages were 
introduced or removed. Thirteen of these correctly chose 
the larger subset in the absence of the garages, but chose 
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the smaller subset <i.e. the full garage> when the garages 
were in position around the cars" <1974:188). 
On average, the children who answered incorrectly or 
inconsistently were slightly younger <mean age 4;1> than 
those who answered correctly (mean age 4;4>. 
Regarding the four all quest·ions, only six childr·en out 
of the 40 tested answered the whole battery correctly. 
However, the authors do not give a full analysis of which 
groups of children who received the all questions before the 
~ questions answered correctly, and vice versa. In this 
respect, the test design appears faulty, since it is 
reasonable to assume that children who received the ~ 
questions before t-he all questions could have interpreted 
the ques.tion: 
Are all the cars on the shelf? 
as: 
Are all the cars <that were on this shelf in the first part 
of the test> on this shelf? 
The authors were apparently aware that the children could be 
interpreting in this way, since they refer to three children 
who, they think, were interpreting ".21.!. as being about ~" 
<1974:190) where the children concerned had received the 
~questions before the all ones. 
However, the analysis of the results does not appear 
detailed enough, since there is no break-do~n of responses 
of the children who received the ~ and all questions in 
reverse order. The importance of the order of receiving the 
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sll and ~ questions appears to have been either 
overlooked or minimised by the authors. 
In their conclusions, the authors mention three kinds 
of rules which the children being tested appear to U$e. 
These. are (1974: 193>: LEXICAL RULES, which are "not finely 
spe~i+ied."; SYNTACTIC RULES, which ''impose few constraints 
by comparison with the c.onstrai nt.s imposed by syntax on an 
adult interpr·et.ation" and LOCAL RULES which "are not 
linguistic rules in the narrow sense though they interact 
with lexical .and syntactic rules in ways that are cr·itical 
for the interpretation of utterances" (1974: 193). 
The authors give the following as examples of LEXICAL 
and SYNTACTIC RULES used by children <1974:190): 
LEXICAL RULES 
"Thus ~' in phrases 1 i l<e more cars or· more water, 
may at a given point in development indicate merely that a 
difference is being referred to and, in some general and 
ill-defined way, that it is a difference in magnitude <and 
not, for instance, in colour> that is at issue." 
SYNTACTIC RULES 
"It is, however, har·d to say much about them at present 
except that they, too, impose few constraints •••• Thus, 
'All the Xs are in Y' can be treated as equivalent to 'All 
the Ys have Xs in them'; that is, the question of which noun 
is quantified, a question that is clearly crucial for an 
adult interpretation, may be disregarded <Donaldson and 
Lloyd in press)". 
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The authors' description of LOCAL RULES is essentially 
that they "deter·mine those features of the referent which 
will be selected as criteria for the assigning of truth 
values when the linguistic rules leave the matter vague. 
They determine that an utterance shall be interpreted now in 
one way, now in another - that there shall be held to be 
more, cars in the· g.arage structure which is full although 
shorter, yet on the other hand more cars in the longer row 
when the garages are not there" <1974:193-4>. Their 
justification for postulating LOCAL RULES is that they are 
an 
"alternative to supposing that for young children 'the 
meaning' of an utterance frequently changes. If we do not 
introduce some such notion we are forced, by evidence of the 
kind pre.sented here, to conclude that, for the children, a 
complex set of alter·native meanings inher·es in the language 
itself'' (1974:194) and the task would then be to explain 
systematic preference for one meaning in a particular 
instance. 
It would appear that the strength of this argument is 
dependent on the following assumptions: 
(a) children can be relied on to answer test questions 
honest.l y; 
(b) children perceive the test in a sufficiently 
realistic way, in that the use of toys and models 
does not lend too artificial an aura to the test; 
<c> children attach the same meanings to key words 
like "shelf" and "garage" as adults do; 
(d) random patterns of incorrect answers are not 
present to a significant extent, i.e. the 
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justifications which children give for incorrect 
answers are not in themselves suspect; 
<e> the questions asked of and instructions given to 
the children are unambiguous. 
As has been already argued, it is the contention of 
this thesis that, especially with regard to assumptions 
<b>,<c>,<d> and (el, the authors are on dangerous ground. 
Asumption (a) is difficult to test; however, some children 
may al te.r their answers for fr i vel ous reasons or because 
they have incorrect perceptions of the purpose of the test. 
An intelligent child may, for example, fail to see the point 
I 
of the particular questions in this test, and change an 
answer which he knows is correct to an incorrect one because 
he may think that there is more t6 the questions than meets 
the eye. 
However, the overriding criticism of this test is that 
it contains elements which are, to a large extent, removed 
from reality. Since truth values of utterances depend 
heavily on the realistic perception of those doing the 
uttering, it would appear in this sense, that this type of 
test is doomed from the beginning. 
In contrast to the one just discussed, a far more 
acceptable test of semantic development is that performed by 
Andersen (1975>. Children were asked to name 25 different 
drinking vessels, most of which would be termed either cups 
or glasses in standard adult English. Most of the items 
were familiar to the children, and those that were not, were 
similar enough to familiar vessels for children to be able 
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to make a realistic attempt at naming them. Having named 
the various vessels, the children wer·e then asked to sort 
them into t.wo groups: cups and glasses. Thi.s exercise, too, 
was realistic since children routinely perform sorting of 
their toys or other possessions. Finally, the children were 
as,ked, t:o define t·he terms cup and glass. This was done 
along the. line.s of the followi.ng: 
"Suppes~ you had a friend from another country and that 
friend didn't speak English very well. And one day he/she 
said to you. 'My mother told me to go to the store and buy 
some cups, but l'm· not sure what a cup is. Can you tell me 
what it is/what it looks like? What would you tell 
him/her?" <1975:85). 
Even though this is, by the admission of the experimenter, 
an "imaginary situation" <1975:85>, it is nevertheless a 
plausible one. A minor criticism might be that, in a real 
situation,· the urgency of the need to convey information of 
the type required would spur the child to provide a more 
complete or more accurate description than he or she would 
in the test situation. 
However, the test as a whole comprises unambiguous 
instructions, although the last one, in which the children 
were asked to choose the best exemplar may have resulted in 
some confusion for the younger children who may not quite 
have understood this instruction: 
"Lastly, each child was asked to choose the best 
examplar for each category from the array on the table. The 
46 
instructions wera to choos~ 'the best example of' or to 
choose 'the- one that looks most like each class sorted'" 
<1975:85). 
It is uncertain whether chi.ldren as young as three 
ye:ars <the- ag.e of the youngest group tested> would 
understand, the phr·a-se best example. of, although the 
alternative e.-xplanati.on on the grounds of similarity in 
appearance might be understood much better. Even here, 
however, children may be confused when asked to point out 
which of a .set looks most like a glass, especially when the 
items in question bear a close resemblance to one another. 
All points o~ method considered, this test is far more 
satisfactory than that of Donaldson and McGarrigle <1974> 
described· earlier in this chapter. The appr·o:<imate dur·ation 
of each session <each child being tested individually> was 
fifteen minutes. This is also pleasing, since in this 
re1atively short time the children would be unlikely to 
become bored or· suffer a loss of concentr·ation. 
Charney <1979> discusses a test of comprehension of the 
dei cti cs here and there by chi 1 dr·en between the ages of 2; 6 · 
and 3;6. She describes her procedure as follows: 
"The exper·iment·er· and child sat on the floor in one of 
the three arrangements shown in Fig. 1.. Two moving toys at 
a tim~ were used: an airplane and a train, or a car and a 
bus. The experimenter and child both participated in 
sending them across the floor to their appropriate places, 
with the child being instructed, with accompanying points, 
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to send the vehicle 'near me', 'by the wall', etc. 
Instructions containing spatial deictic words were, of 
course, avoided. After the toys were in place, the 
experimenter said, for example: 
See the airplane? <waited for the child to look at it>. 
1 
See the t·rain? <waited for the child to look at it>. 
Which one is over here/there? 
The chi.ld was then expected to point to, name, or touch 
the correct object. The experimenter always looked at the 
child and never· gestured. One e:<ception was if the child 
did not respond to, for example, 'See the air.pla.ne'. In 
such a case, the experimenter would point out the airplane 
to the child, make sure he looked at it, and then resume the 









Same perspective 1\cutral perspective Opposite pcrspe.:tiYe 
Fi~. 1 Position o+ E <experimenter>, C <Child) and 
toys in the thr·ee perspective cond it i ens. 
Approximate distances <in metres> are 
indi.cated." 
<"1979:71-2) 
Fig. 2 (Fig. 1 in Charney, 1979) 
The artifici.ality of the experimental situation gives 
ris~ to a number of flaws in this test. First, the fact 
that the experimenter has to ensure that the child is paying 
attention <or obeying instructions> by looking at the 
appropriate object when asked to do so, raises some doubt as 
to whether the child's responses to the k~y question 
thereafter, viz. 
Which one is over here/there? 
are reliable. The child may not fully distinguish the car 
from the bus, for instance, and his lexical response (if 
any) may be incorrectly stated, i.e. he may mean bus but say 
£..2.!:. The fact that only vehicles <or means of transport> 
are used here, could give rise to errors of overextension as 
well as of deixis. On the other hand, whimsical answers 
are also possible (the children tested being very young, in 
the age range 2;6 to 3;6>. 
The second flaw in this test is the situation termed 
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the neutral perspective. Although the toys are equidistant 
~rom the child, both toys are closer to the speaker <the 
experimenter) than to the child. A more neutral arrangement 
would have been to have the child, experimenter and the toy 
<~urther from tha experimenter) situated at the vertices of 





In the above figure, T:a. and T::z represent the toys. 
Another minor flaw, or discrepancy, is that the toys are 
actually slightly further from the child in the neutral 
perspective <1,25m) as opposed to the distances in the other 
cases <1,15m>. Al.though this is not a serious difference, 
the child being tested may be influenced by the slightly 
longer distance involved in the "neutral" perspective. The 
use of the word "neutral" here is also a little odd, in that 
it is not, strictly speaking, a neutral perspective. Before 
discussing what_ is perhaps potentially the major flaw in the 
experimental design, it is useful to examine the test 
results for the entire group. For analysis purposes, the 
author (1979:73) has split these into two sub-groups, by 
age, with 25 children in each sub-group: 
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TABLE I. Percentage correct in the three perspective-conditions 
Same Neutral Opposite 
Age here there TotaL here. there Total here there Total Total 
2:; 6-J; O• 63•0: 86·o 74'5 67"0 8o·o• 73"5 73"0 6o~-·o 68·s 72"0 
3; o-3; 6· 8J."0' 89"0 86·o 73"0. 91"0 Sz·o 89"0 64:0 76·s 82·o 
Total. 73"0 87"5 8o·3 70"0 Ss·s n·S 81·0 64•0 72"5 n·o 
f·or there, in the case. of· the· cond:i.tion, "same 
pe.r·spec:ti . ve.". The. dif·f·erence· <in this. perspective 
cond:i.ti.on > i.n percentag.es be·tween the- younger and older 
s.ub-gr·oups· f·or "here." is 2(), 0. This seems. st·range since 
one· would have· thought· that. the· use of ~-' in this 
condition, would be correct to a large· degree for both 
groups. Certainly, here should not be more difficult than 
there, on an intuitive analysis of thesa perspectives. 
However, if one exam'i nes the key questions again, one r·eads 
these. as_. :-
Which one is over here? and 
Which one is over there? 
The use of· ~. in conjunc:ti.on with here is a 1 ittle 
odd to say the· lea·st, if this is indeed what the 
experimenter did. Admittedly, the· children involved spoke 
an Americ.an dialect of Eng:lish,. in whi.ch 9.Y.§!: may be· more 
11 ne.utral" than in other parts of the English-speaking 
world. However, the use of over here is odd. !f both E 
and C share the same perspective, then it should suffice to 
say, simply, "here". The children being tested, especially 
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the younger ones, could well have been confused by the use 
of this phr·ase. It seems more natural to use the phrase 
over here where speaker and hearer are in different places, 
not when they share the same perspective. 
The use. o.f the expre.ssi on over here appears to have 
arisen because Charney adapted the procedure used by de 
Villiers and de Villiers <1972> to a different set of 
circumstances without fully considering a crucial 
di st·i net ion. Charne-y uses over· her·e when both chi 1 d and 
experimenter are in the same place, whereas de Villiers and 
de Villiers do not. To quote Charney: 
"In the de Villiers study the experimenter and child 
always sat on opposite sides of a short wall. The child 
could successfully find a candy hidden under a cup by 
• following the experimenter's clues of 'the M ~ M is on 
this/that side of the wall' and 'TheM~ M is over 
here/there'"C1979:70>. Clearly, over here is used in a 
crucially different way in the de Villiers study. 
Kuczaj and Daly <1979> describe a "quasi-e:<per·imental 
study" (563) on the subject of hypothetical reference in the 
speech of young children. The authors regard the 
development of the child's ability to indulge in 
hypothetical r·eference as a "subtype of the child's 
developing ability to refer to non-present objects and 
occur·rences" < 1979: 564 > • In their introduction, the authors 
are careful to classify "non-present happenings" into si:< 
categories, each category representing the degree of belief 
held by the speaker in the event either having occurred, or 
being likely to occur in the future. 
This study comes up against one of the central problems 
experienced by researchers into semantic development : that 
of interpreting the responses of children to adults' 
que.sti ons. But here· the problem is compounded, because this 
study involves children's response& to hypothetical 
questions. For very young children it is difficult to say 
wher·e the line bet·ween fact and fantasy lies: it is 
precisely this distinction which is crucial to the 
interpretation of children's utterances. For example, the 
authors give the following as an example of an ''irrelevant 
response" to a hypothetical question: 
II Adult 
What if you didn't grow up? 
What if you stopped growing 
up and grew out sideways and 
just got wider and wider? 
Child 
I'm gonna be hey-dittle-
dittle in the moon. I 
wanta be hey-dittle-dittle 
the cow. I'm gonna be hey-
dittle-dittle in the sun 
<A. K. 2; 1()) II 
( 1979: 568) 
The authors do not say why they regard this <2 year and 
10 month old> child's response as irrelevant. The 
experimenter's question is <in a sense> nonsensical, since 
chi.l dren presumably believe that they illJ.. gr·ow up (both 
l.iterally upwards and maturationally>. It is not 
surprising, then, for a young child to respond in terms of 
what <to an adult) appears sheer fantasy. After all, if he 
is not going to grow up normally, into a normal adult, 
surely his desire to become a nursery rhyme character is, 
53 
54 
for him, the choice o+ a possible alternative! If children 
can't. grow up into normal people, then why not into ani.mal s'? 
For a child as young a·s 2; 10, the reality or otherwise of 
nursery rhyme characters is hard to determine. This makes 
the classification of this response as irrelevant, difficult 
to understand.. lt is· not as if the child had uttered a 
non·sense syllable in reply;· it doe.s seem that the child has 
made an attempt to respond to the demands of the question. 
Kuczaj and Daly <ga •. cit.> began their testing 
p.rocedure by a·sking each child individually to tell a story 
about a lion. They describe their (i.e. the. e:<perimenter·s'> 
behaviour as +ollows: 
"During this phase, the experimenter avoided using 
hypothetical terms, instead using prompts such as What 
happened ne:<t·-;:· and and then what happened? to encourage the 
child to cont.inue with his story. Following this, the 
experimenter read one of a set o+ three very short stories 
to the child, and then immediately asked the child factual, 
future hypothetical and past hypothetical questions about 
the story. This procedure was then repeated for the 
remaining two stories" (1979:567). 
In a subsequent analysis of children's hypothetical 
reference, the authors refer to the "non-hypothetical 
reference story <about lion>" <1979:571) and contrast this 
with the "hypothetical reference stor·i es" which they <the 
experimenters) told. This distinction appears odd since 
all the children <presumably) invented their story about a 
lion, surely this, too, ought to be classified as 
hypothetical ref·erence. Surely the di ff i cul ty here is to 
separate fact from fantasy in the perceptions of the 
children being tested. Once a story is being related, both 
spe·ak and 1 istener are involved in the context of fantasy. 
A child who says The.n l'm a cow as opposed to Then I would 
be. a c:ow. cannot really be· said to be meaning somethi.ng 
di~ferent from· w~at is entailed by the second sentence. The 
authors have to. contend with this problem in attempting to 
classify childrens' utterances <1979:572-3) as being either 
internally consistent or inconsistent hypothetical reference 
sequences. 
They do, however, acknowledge the tentativeness of 
their research in their discussion of the data, by saying 
that they are of~fer·i ng "a speculative account for each of 
~our developmental patterns'' <1979:575>. In this 
connection, the authors' fourth-mentioned developmental 
pattern, viz. "children's higher degree of accuracy in self-
initiated than in other·-initiated hypothetical r·eference" 
<1979:575) is· interesting. This suggests that a child finds 
it easier to construct a sequence of hypothetical references 
than to comprehend a sequence constructed by an adult 
<1979:578). Many tests o~ semantic development (including 
this one) involve children in first comprehending the 
cognitive framework of the test and then making appropriate 
responses within that framework. However, if the test 
appears to be too much like a game, then a child may respond 
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capriciously. It may not be that he is lacking in the 
specific area of semantic development being tested; it may 
simply be that he is overwhelmed by the test situation as a 
whole and therefore adopts a strategy which avoids the real 
issue.s. In short, the child, in an artificial test 
situa·tioA, manipulated by an experimenter· whose aims and 
mot i ve:s. are beyond the child's understanding, may not be a 
reliable subject, if indeed he is able to be a subject at 
all. 
Corrigan and Odya-Weis <1985) carried out a study of 
the comprehension of semantic relations by two-year-olds, 
using tokens <a red felt triangle and a green felt square> 
to represent actors and patients in sentences with both 
subjects and objects. Both actors and patients could be 
animate or inanimate. In a preliminary training session, 
the children were shown a number of pictures depicting 
actions, e.g. a boy pulling a boat or a bike pulling a dog. 
The experimenter would then place one of the tokens on the 
agent and the other on the patient, using one token 
consistently as agent and the other consistently as patient, 
for each child. In all, 48 children were tested of whom 
half were trained to associate the red token with the actor 
and half to associate the green token with the actor. The 
voice of the sentences was also varied: "In all 
presentation?, the sentence form was varied so that half 
were in the active voice and half in the passive voice" 
<1985:52>. Once the child had seen the experimenter placing 
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the ~okens a number of times, he <the child> was asked to 
take over the placing unti.l "the child corr·ectly placed both 
tokens for 5 of 6 consecutive sentences or for 5 in a row" 
(1985:52>. 
Tha child was then directed to the body of the test, 
which involved. the p.lacing of tokens on 12 pictures: "three 
new sent·ences f·or each sentence type <AI, AA, IA and I I> 
were· presented, once each with no corrective feedback given. 
Both tokens were available, so that the child had to choose 
which tokens were appropriate. Children were praised 
verbally or given a star or sticker when they placed the 
tokens on the pictures, even if their responses were not 
correct" <1985:52-3>. 
In this context, the symbols A and I appearing in the 
sentence types represent Animate and Inanimate respectively, 
e.g~ AI stands for a sentence in which the actor is animate 
and the patient inanimate. 
Before discussing the test results, some comments on 
the authors' method are required. Praise is a very strong 
reinforcing action with children; one wonders, therefore, 
why an incorrect placing of tokens by a child was rewarded. 
It seems likely that this could lead to the child forming a 
mistake pattern, and being praised for each successive 
mi$take! It is not unlikely that two-year old children, who 
have only recently been ''trained" to distinguish between 
actors and patients by a process of association in short-
term memory, could just as easily reverse their response 
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pattern i~ they were praised for an incorrect response. 
Also, since the child is accustomed to experiencing real-
li~e actions of kicking, pulling and pushing Call of which 
tend to be of relatively short duration>, he may not 
necessarily interpret the static "actions" depicted by 
pictures in quite the same way as he would a real action. 
E:ven though the· authors were careful to avoid a right-
left or large-small bias <1985:51) in the actors and 
patient.s appearing in the pict·ures, the fact that both actor 
and patient ~re static in the pictures is at odds with what 
normally obtains in a real situation, where the actor is 
seen to "move first", as it were. What the author·s are 
really testing is the child's comprehension of actor and 
patient in static pictures, as opposed to the comprehension 
of this semantic relat·ion in a natural, dynamic occurrence. 
The difference is subtle; yet it is important: semantic 
relations. are broader than those formed by a study of 
pictures alone. 
The fact that children's semantic development is often 
tested with the ai~ of pictures and toys, in a more or less 
constr·ained e:<perimental situation, makes it difficult to 
generalise the results of these tests. They may, through 
their arti~icial nature, be seriously lacking in validity. 
Unlike adults, who possess advanced metalinguistic ability, 
children, who are not able to read and thus reflect on 
sentence structure to the same extent as their elders, are 
problematic subjects in tests of this nature. Serious 
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thought needs to be given to finding methods of probing or 
assessing <rather than testing> children's semantic 
development under less stilted and restricted conditions. 
Fromberg <1976> illustrates a language-learning game 
which appears to have some merit since it employs objects 
which the· chi.ld actually sees and is able to touch. In her· 
"grab-bag." game, the teacher models descriptions of objects 
which are at first hidden inside a bag, but are later 
revealed t.o the onlooker: 
"I feel something cold 
I +eel something wet 
I feel something cold and wet but not greasy. 
It's ice! " 
(1976:254) 
This procedure is then repeated with objects like cane 
and sandpaper. The children are then asked to play the 
game: the fact that real sensations are being described, 
albeit in a game context, is a positive feature of this 
research. However, if children are asked to describe 
pictur·es of objects of which they may not have "hands-on" 
experience, their descriptions will not necessarily be as 
reliable. They may simply describe what they think are the 
correct attributes of the object depicted. 
MacWhinney <1983) describes a test involving a minature 
linguistic system <MLS> consisting of "eight object names" 
and "four locative affixes" <1983:471>. Childr·en had to 
place toy animals in various locations relative to the 
objects. The animal models used were: "frogs, dinosaurs, 
lions, monkeys, bears, dragons, trolls and robots" 
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( 1983: 473). The choice of animals is rather strange, 
espec.ially those of dinosaur, dragon, tr·oll and robot. It 
would certainly confound a biologist to be told that a robot 
was a type of animal! Certainly, this choice is not quite 
in keeping with the author's stated aim of maximising 
"linguistic naturalness. and refer·entiality" (1983:467>. The 
game takes on an even less realistic note when the author 
describes his procedure: 
"For example, the four dragons were called Puff, Harr·y, 
Feather and Diane. The child was then told that the dragons 
<or the frogs or some other animal family> wanted to visit 
one of the four 'hotels'. For example, the dragons may have 
been interested in visiting the 'nak'. Thus, Puff may want 
to go naksib, Harry might want to go renaken 
o o o o o o o o II ( 1983: 4 73-4·) o The author defines nak to mean cube 
and the affixes -sib and ra- -em to mean "in" and "behind" 
respectively. <Incidentally the word renaken in 
MacWhinney's article should be spelt ranakem>. 
Despite the fact that, in Hungarian and other natural 
languages, noun-plus-affix structures do exist (1983:471>, 
the "naturalness" of the language alone is not sufficient to 
guarantee a natural language situation. Since extinct and 
incorrectly defined animals are used as models, the 
situation takes on an artificial aspect. Although nonsense 
words may not have the same effect on all children 
undergoing the test, some children may find them confusing. 
The combination of nonsense words and far-fetched exemplars 
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of animals is also unfortunate : it lends an unnecessarily 
artificial flavour to the whole experiment. 
In this chapter, a number of research articles have 
been cited and discussed to illustrate the point that 
semantic tests administered to children often lack a 
realistic context. It would appear that some researchers do 
not pay enough a·ttention to making their test situations as 
, life-like as possible. Because these tests are, to a 
greater or lesser extent, artificial in nature, the 
conclusions reached therein are open to question. In or·der 
to overcome the objections which have been raised in this 
chapter, and to avoid pitfalls in future tests, the 
following basic guidelines should be adopted: 
1. Test ~aterials should be realistic. 
2. Models should bear a close resemblance to the objects 
which they represent, both in form and in function. 
3. Exemplars of categories should be familiar; for 
example, if animals are being used, then exotic animals 
should not appear in the test. 
4. Models and artifacts should be avoided, and the real 
thing used wherever possible. 
5. Pictures which distort proportion should be avoided. 
6. There should be no ambiguity in the description of the 
test procedure. 
7 The language used to address the children being tested 
should be clear and concise. 
8. As in all tests of language development, the time 
should be kept to a minimum, in order to prevent 
boredom and fatigue on the part of the child subjects. 
There are clearly some researchers who use games 
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skilfully in tests of language development. However, 
the connection between the gama and the real situation 
of everyday language use needs to be understood very 
clearly by the researcher. 
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Chapter 4 
A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE LANGUAGE OCCURRING IN TEST 
ITEMS IN STUDIES OF SEMANTIC DEVELOPMENT 
. In Chapters Two and Three of this thesis, there was a 
general discussion of the ar·ti f i c i al nat-ure of 1 anguage 
dsvelopment test situations and the inappropriateness of 
various test props and materials. The language used in the 
test items of a LD experiment is important for the obvious 
reason that clarity of meaning is a precondition for 
obtaining valid responses. In this chapter, two issues in 
research methods used in semantic development studies will 
be discussed, both of which involve the type of language 
used in test items. 
The first issue is the LISe of "nonsense wor·ds" or 
"nonsense syllables" in test.s of semantic development. 
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Nonsense words <syllables> were given prominence in tests of 
LD by Berko's <1958> research into syntactic development. 
Berko's test involved the use of a number of nonsense 
syllables <NS> e.g. wug. In one section of the test, 
subjects were shown a picture of an object resembling a bird 
and were told "This is a wug". They were subsequently 
shown a picture of two of these objects and were asked to 
name them. The required response was : "There ar·e two 
wugs"~ Berko had set out to test whether the subjects had 
mastered the use of the English plural affix -§..!_ A nonsense 
syllable was chosen to obviate the objection that the word 
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bird <and its plural, birds) wer-e- aleady familiar to the 
subjects~ It is interesting to note that Berko's research 
concentrated on syntactic development. It was published in 
the year following the appearance of Chomsky's Syntactic 
Structures in 1957. 
Berko tested a group of children in an experimental 
setting, using NS as well as 'real' words. Interestingly 
enough, the syntactic inflections which children gave to 
'real' words were more often correct than those they gave to 
NS. Her research set a precedent for the use of NS in tests 
of language d~velopment. It is thus not surprising that a 
subsequent researcher, Harris, should make use of NS in a 
test of semantic development. 
ln his article "Infer·ences and semantic development", 
Harris < 1975> made use of NS in order to test whether· "the 
nominal predication of an unknown word by a superordinate 
term enables young children to make appropriate inferences 
concerning its attributes" <143>. 
for the use of NS i.n his research 
Harris gives two reasons 
"First, becaLtse they 
could obviously not be ascribed attributes except on an 
inferential basis. This would not necessarily be true if 
the subject were questioned about a familiar hyponym. 
Secondly,. it was hoped to provide an approximation to normal 
acquisition processes in which a new word is defined by 
inclusion" <1975:143>. 
In this chapter the three experiments described by 
Harris will be discussed, with particular reference to the 
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use of NS. A+ter this discussion, there will be an 
assessment of the usefulness of NS in research into semantic 
development. An important issue is whether NS are suitable 
instr·uments in tests of semantic development, or· whether 
they are more suited to tests of syntactic development. In 
his research, Harris used children aged from 4;6 to 7;4. In 
the fi.rst experiment 16 children took part, in the second 
experiment there were· 32 children and in the third, there 
were 24. Harris does not describe the duration or setting 
of the experiment, nor does he state whether some of the 
children took part in more than one experiment. 
Harris's first experiment 
This was divided into two parts. In the first part, 
"the children were questioned about the attributes of one of 
fo~r entities - man, bird, aeroplane and house. 
questions were posed: 
(i) 
( i i ) 
(iii) 
Dties a ---- eat food? 
Does a ---- have wings? 
Is a ---- alive? 
Thr·ee 
The same three questions were then asked of the next 
entity, and so forth. Answers were recorded as yes or no. 
The second stage of the experiment consisted of the same set 
of three questions posed in relation to four NS - mib, lak, 
An NS was paired with an entity by simple nominal 
predication. For example, the child would be told a 'mib' 
i s a man " < 1 975: 144 > • 
Harris states that the experimenter checked whether the 
infor·mati on had been understood by asking the chi 1 d "and 
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what is a mib?" If the subject replied correctly, the 
experimenter proceeded with questions (i)-(iii) above 
<1975:144). However, in some cases subjects "failed to 
identify a mib correctly, in which case the definition and 
preliminary checks were repeated'' <1975:144). Harris does 
not eiaborate on these failures to understand the NS, but 
they do appear to be si gni f i c.ant. If nothing else, they 
appear to indicat.e that the subjects were having difficulty 
in defining a NS, or at least in equating it with a familiar 
lexical item. The potential confusion caused by the use of 
NS will b·e discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
Harris e~<plains that the pairing of the four 
superordinate terms <which he refers to as entities) with 
the four NS was "systematically varied across children to 
rule out the effects of onomatopoeia'' <1975:144). Children 
were then asked questions about the attributes of the 
hypothetical object referred to by each NS. The assumption 
here was that the children would be able to infer these 
attributes from those of the entity (i.e. superordinate 
term> to which the NS had been linked. Harris explains 
further· that "each question was designed to elicit two 
affirmatives and two negatives across the four entities" 
<1975:144>. This design, one must assume, came about in 
order to minimise the effects of patterns of guessing by the 
children e.g. a pattern in which a child answered 
affirmatively to every question. 
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Results of the first experiment 
Harris found that almost all of the 16 children tested 
gave the correct attributes for the NS with respect to 
quest.ions (i) and Cii). However, six subjects, in the case 
of question <iii> had diffjc.ulty in deciding whether the NS 
as'socia.ted wit·h the le:<ic.al item aer·oplane is animate. 
Furthermore these six children, together with another three, 
answered in the affirmative to the question Is an aer·oplane 
alive? Harris does not investigate the question of an 
aeroplane's animacy further. This is unfortunate, since it 
would have been an interesting line of study. 
In retrospect, it is difficult to determine whether the 
use of NS in the f·irst test is justified. Bearing in mind 
that Harris had taken great pains to equate each NS with a 
corresponding le:<ical item, it would seem reasonable to 
assume that the subjects treated each NS as a code name or 
strange synonym for the entity with which it had been 
linked, rather than as a hyponym. Therefore, the main 
criticism of Harris's first test is that it does not clearly 
achieve the goal of establishing that the child subjects 
understand· and apply the hyponymy relation at all. The 
problem of the animacy feature of aeroplane is also left 
unresolved. In fact, Harris omits aeroplane <as well as 




Harris's second experiment 
In this test, Harris used four superordinate terms and 
~our hyponyms, one for each superordinate. The lexical 
items use.d were: bird <robin>; m.sm. <busdri ver >; f 1 ower <r:Qa§) 
and~ drink <milk>. As in the first test, Harris refers to 
the superordinate terms as "entities" .• 
The second test was designed to investigate whether the 
child subjects could show evidence of recognising the 
sup~rordinate terms as such. In his procedure, Harris used 
the same. questions as in the first test, but "an additional 
question was also posed, e.g. Is the robin a bird? Is the 
busdriver a man?,etc." <1975:148>. 
After this, each "entity" was again pair·ed with a NS, 
and the four questions were asked with reference to the NS. 
The four·th question in this case took the for·m : "Is a mi b a 
robin'? .. (1975: 148>. There is a subtle yet important 
difference in the wording of the questions used by Harris in 
this test. In the questions involving the real hyponyms, he 
uses the definite article :t..ru!, as in Is the robin a bir·d? 
However, in the questions containing the NS, he uses the 
indefinite article A, as, for example, in Is a mib a robin? 
In English, the article the, being specific, usually 
precedes an exemplar whereas ~ is more often found before a 
cat.egory. It would therefore seem that, by using the 
syntactic framework Is the X a Y?, the implication is made 
that X is a hyponym of Y. This framework acts as a subtle 
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clue to the listener. Having used this framework in the 
'r·eal-.wor·d' questions, Har·ri s switches to the for·m found in 
Is a mib a robin? in his subsequent NS questions. 
Harris appears to be inconsistent in his use of syntax 
her·e. The NS mib, which had been equated with the entity 
bir·d in the ear·lier· par·t of· the research, but which Harris 
int.ends to take the place of a hyponym of bird, is now 
preceded by the indefinite article ~· However, being a 
placeholder of an exemplar, it should be preceded by the. A 
similar comment applies to the use of ~ before robin in this 
NS question : its use suggests that robin is not an 
exemplar, but a category. By rights, then, Harris should 
have used the fcllowing wording : 
Is the mib the robin? A negative answer to the latter 
question, taken in conjunction with an affirmative answer to 
Is the robin a bird? would be a better indicator of the 
child subject's possession of a superordinate category. 
However, the use of NS bedevils Harris's research : 
simply because a NS does not refer to a real object, and is 
therefore a vague form of reference, it is odd to allow it 
to be pr·eceded by the article the. The very use of NS thus 
places this research on a shaky basis. 
Results of the second experiment 
Harris obtained the result that "for the three 
entities, bird, !lli!!J. and flower·, subjects were as likely to 
match as mismatch. Thus knowing that a mib was a bird, a 
child was as likely as not to agree that a mib was a robin" 
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( 1975: 148) • This finding is not surprising in view of the 
potentially confusing use of 2. and the in the test 
questions. In fact, a seemingly incorrect answer, i.e. that 
a mi b is a robin, might have come about thr·ough the 
postulation of a se.cond tier of classification on the part 
of a- subject, viz; that a. mib_ is (a type of) robin and that 
a robin is <a type of·) bird:. 
However, Harris mentions that a number of children 
justified their answers in sentences which indicated that 
they do "possess a genuine superordinate category". 
Examples of such sentences were : 
"Some flowers aren't roses" and 
"A few birds are robins" 
( 1975: 148). 
With e:<planations such as these, it appears as if the test 
design could have been differentJ rather than using NS, 
Harris could have spent more time on attempting to elicit 
this type of utterance from the subjects. 
Harris points out that, in the case of the NS dog, 
there was a general tendency to mismatch this with milk. 
Most of the children answered that these two were 
equivalent. Interestingly, Harris omits the form of the 
actual question here. If th~ form Is a dop a milk?· was 
used, it would have been ungrammatical, and any other form 
would have been inconsistent with that used in Is a mib a 
robin? Harris does not elaborate on the reasons for the 
differ·ent results in the case of dop and milk, other· than to 
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state that some children justified their mismatch by 
referring to some quality of milk <e.g. its colour>. It is 
a further flaw of Harris's research that he selected a 
superordinate ter·m which can function as a verb as well as a 
noun, ire. drink. For many children, the use of drink as a 
superordinate may not be very familiar. An adult might be 
mora likely to ask a child 
Would you like something to drink? than to ask 
Would you like a drink? 
This is a minor point, yet it may contribute to Harris's 
results in the case of milk. 
Harris's third experiment 
In his third experiment, Harris paired a NS "with a. 
superordinate category plus an attribute, e.g. A 'mib' is a 
red bird'' (1975:149>. This experiment sought to assess the 
child's "sensitivity to attr·ibutes which distinguish 
subordinates from each other" <1975:149>. The finding was 
that the addition of an attribute did not impair the 
children's ability to infer common attributes. For example, 
whether a bird was red or white, it was still thought to 
have wings. On the other· hand, children denied that a "NS 
defined as a white bird was a robin or that a NS defined as 
a red drink was milk" <1975:149). 
Interestingly, a ~arge number of children would not 
agree that the NS defined as red bird was, in fact, a robin. 
Harris ascribes this to the children's perception of a robin 
as being only partly red. Many children thought that robins 
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aren't red because they have brown feathers. This is a 
small point, but it does show that children are able to 
perceive subtle differences in meaning, differences which 
may be glossed over by adults. In designing tests of 
semantic development, experimenters need to be careful that 
the~r descriptions of re~erents to be used in the tests are 
e:<treme.l y accurate. 
However, the children's reluctance to agree that a NS 
defined as a red bird was a robin may also be taken to mean 
that they are confused by the use of a NS. When the NS was 
originally associated with bird, it may have been still 
relatively vague in its reference. On the other hand, its 
association with a specific animal, a robin, may be less 
easy for the subject to accept. This is another difficulty 
underlying the use of NS in Harris's research. Seen as a 
whole, the use of NS by Harris does not appear to have been 
a profitable exercise. He appears to have overlooked some 
basic differences between using NS in a test of semantic 
development as against one of syntactic development. The 
first of these is that semantics is more 'sensitive' to 
nonsense than syntax is. A worthwhile question to be 
considered is : should one test semantic development by 
using non-words, i.e. nonsense syllables? 
Another important consideration is the purported use of 
NS to avoid introducing a 'clue' to the subjects of the 
test. In Berko's test wug was used instead of the le:dcal 
item bird. This was because of the probability that the 
72 
73 
children being tested had already heard the plural form 
bir·ds. Har·r is uses NS "because they coLtl d obviously not be 
ascribed attributes except on an inferential basis" 
( 1975: 143). However, by using a less familiar, yet real, 
hyponym, Harris·would have been likely to have achieved the 
s·ame. aim. Since he was testing British children, he could 
for example_ have used an Ltnfami liar bird like a kiwi as a 
hyp·onym.. In fact, to ensure that a wor·d like !:J:..!':!i is 
un~amiliar to the children, one could ask appropriate 
questions. in a pre-test, such as What is a kiwi? In this 
way, an experimenter could compile a list of words which 
were unfamiliar to the child subjects befgre commencing the 
test proper. 
His second r·eason for using a NS was "to pr·ovide an 
approximation to normal acquisition processes in which a new 
word is defined by inclusion". By using an unfamiliar 
hyponym, selected by means of the method described in the 
last paragraph, an experimenter could meet this requirement 
as well. The use of a NS in order to achieve an 
approximation to normal ac~uisition processes is odd. 
Normal semantic development precludes the acquisition Of 
nonsense syllables - at least as hyponyms of real 
superordinate terms. Even in a test of syntactic 
development, such as that of Berko, the use of NS is 
questionable. Here, too, an unfamiliar word could just as 
easily be used. 
Earlier, in the discussion of the first experiment, it 
was mentioned that some children had difficulty in 
understanding the pairing of a NS with a lexical item. If a 
child finds difficulty in pairing a nonsense phrase or word 
with a real entity, the central purpose of the test may be 
undermined. It seems reasonable to assume that this 
mismatch may so confuse a child that the rest of the test 
may become meaningless for him. Above all, the experimenter 
should make it clear to the child that although nonsense 
words or phrases are being used, the test itself is not a 
silly game or a waste of time. It may help to explain to 
the child that the experimenter is 'trying to find out some 
things about language' or 'working out how children learn to 
speak'. It is not clear in many cases whether children are 
made aware, even in very simple terms, of the purpose of the 
test they are undergoing. 
The second issue to be discussed in this chapter is the 
use of tests of semantic development which involve 
children's judgements of the semantic acceptability of test 
sentences. NS are not involved here, but rather sentences 
which are semantically anomalous. Considerable research has 
been focussed on children's judgements of such sentences, 
and most of this research is based on the work of two 
investigators, James and Miller <1973). Whether or not 
subsequent researchers modify the methods used by the 
originators of a particular line of research, the original 
methods tend to persist. It appears that, in the particular 
research area under discussion in the remainder of this 
74 
75 
chapter, the methods of the research originators have at 
times been adopted uncritically. 
James and Miller (1973> presented children with a 
number of test sentences, asking the subjects whether, as 
Carr (1979:228) describes it, each sentence sounded 
" ••.••• ft.tnny/o.k., acceptable/unacceptable". It is 
int·erest·ing to note that Carr modified the James and Miller 
technique, stating that children may not understand this 
type of question. Carr tested children aged between 2;0 and 
3;6. She quite rightly avoided words like "acceptable", 
"unacceptable" and even the ambiguous "funny". Instead she 
chose to use "~" questions, such as 
"Can a dog eat'?" She used six types of pr·edi cate, in 
groups of eight instances of each predicate type. Of each 
group of eight instances, four had animate·and four 
inanimate, subjects. An example of the data obtained by 
Car·r is given below ( 1979: 232) 
II ( 1) Animate predicate Wake up 
-Q Can a flower wake up? A. No 
-Q Can a plate wake l.tp'? A. No eat dinner on 
them 
+Q Can a dog wake up'"i' A. Yes 
+Q Can a cat wake up? A. Yes on the bed 
-Q Can a bus wake up? A. Yes 
-Q Can a bucket wake up? A. No have water 
+Q Can a bird wake up? A. No! fl~ UQ 
+Q Can a rabbit wake up? A. Yes" 
Incorrect answers have been underlined. It is 
interesting to note that questions were framed in sequences 
of two with negative correct answers (-Q) followed by two 
with positive correct answers (+Q). In both cases where the 
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child has made an error, it is seen that the error occurs in 
a question where there is a change in the <correct> 
response. The child answers Yes incorrectly immediately 
after two questions where Yes was the correct answer. The 
child also answers No inc.orrectly after two questions where 
No would: have been the correct response. 
It is possible that the child +alls, at least partly, 
into a pattern of responses when confronted by questions 
with "ye.s/no" answer·s. Also, the correctness or 
incorrectness of a re.sponse should not be seen as absolute, 
but rather as relative to the experience of the child. 
Thus, a child who responds yes to the possibility of a cat 
or dog waking up but No, fly up to the question Can a bird 
wake up? may simply be reflecting what his experience has 
been. How many adults, for instance, have ~a bir·d wake 
up'? The child has, however, probably seen a bird flying 
upwards, so given his presumed experience, the reply is 
understandable. 
It is instructive to consider some of the questions 
involving predicates other than Wake up, and to notice the 
cases where the judgement of the child becomes more 
controver·si al : 
II -Q. Can fish be tied in a parcel'? A. 
-Q. Can scissors bite? A. 
-Q. Can a dog be scribbled on? A. 
( 1979: 232-3). 
In the above instances, the line between an anomalous and a 
non-anomalous sentence becomes indistinct. Is it true that 
a dog cannot be sC::ri bti=d on'7-' Perhaps the chi 1 d has actually 
tried to make a mark on a dog with a piece of chalk, and has 
suc.ceeded ! It seems that the interpretation of sentences as 
anomalous or not is often a very open one. Interviewers and 
designers of tests should be careful in their selection of 
items, so that this type of marginal case does not become 
misleading,. resulting in faulty conclusions. 
Another research study will now be discussed. 
Emerson <1979> tested children's intuitions regarding 
logical and illogical sentences in a study of children's 
comprehension of the word because. In the case of the 
youngest grotip of children being tested <five year olds>, 
Emerson used pictures of a lady and a clown to elicit 
judgements of the logicality of statements : 
"This is the teacher and this is the c:lown. The clown 
is a silly clown. He always says things that do not sound 
right or things that cannot really happen. The teac:her 
always says things that sound sensible, things that can 
really happen. The clown says things like : The dog drove 
the car. That's silly, isn't it? Can you tell me what's 
silly about it? Can you change the sentence to make it a 
sensible sentence? <If no response : We could make it 
sensible by saying The man drove the car. That sounds all 
right, doesn't it? Or The dog chased the car. That would 
be sensible, wouldn't it?>" <1979:291>. 
What Emerson is doing here is actually making the 
judgements for the children, and then asking them to agree 
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with her. By using tag questions like isn't it? and doesn't 
it?, she is giving the children very str·ong prompts, to say 
the least. Also, the choice of sentence is not the best : 
for some children, the possibility of a dog driving a car 
mi.ght not be remote. Children are exposed to cartoons in 
which ani mal s talk,. wear clothes and even, in some cases, 
opera·te machinery. Hence this sentence may not. appear 
"silly" to all children. The fact that, in Emerson's study, 
some children did not respond could indicate a real 
confusion on their part. There is also a problem involved 
in the use of the word sensible, as it is applied to the 
idead of a dog chasing a car. While the sentence The dog 
chased the car is non-anomalous, the action of a dog in 
chasing a car is not a sensible action. The dog could be 
maimed or even killed by the car, or by another vehicle. 
In the previous chapter, there was a discussion of the 
use of toys and models as props in tests of semantic 
development. Children, who play with toys and models, 
experience fantasy often as part of their everyday routine. 
Cartoons, fairy-tales and other children's stories also 
introduce elements of fantasy into the world-view of 
chi ldr·en. Given that children have a perspective on the 
world which, in general, differs from an adult one, 
experimenters should be sensitive to this when designing 
tests o+ semantic anomaly. Children may not find it 
anomalous that a dog should drive a car, but may find it odd 
if a dog were given, for example, cat-like attributes, such 
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as the ability to climb trees or to spit and hiss. 
Researchers into semantic development would do well to bear 
the question of child vs. adult world-view in mind when 
designin9 test items. 
Emerson does not allow for the fact that clowns do say 
some sensible things and teachers do say some silly things. 
ln thi~ respect, the method she has used, <borrowed from 
James and Miller, <1973>>, creates an artificial context for 
the judgments of the acceptability of sentences. Her 
example of a "silly" statement by the teacher is "The cat 
flew away'' (1979:291). Some caution must be exercised with 
this example :. strictly speaking, it is anomalous, but it is 
a context-free statement. It does not, for example, sound 
anomalous in the following situation. An adult has just 
seen a dog jumping over a fence and chasing a cat. He 
reports this incident by saying : "The dog jumped over the 
fence, ran towards the cat and the cat flew away''. In fact 
the wor·d flew is often used metaphorically, e.g. time flew 
or he flew into a· rage. If adults use words in this way, it 
is quite possible that some children do as well. 
It is interesting to note that Emerson has adopted the 
method used by James and Miller uncritically, whereas Carr 
(1979) judges this method to be inappropriate. This is an 
important instance of two researchers in the area of child 
language using very diffe~ent methods to conduct similar 
types of research. There appears to be a need to evaluate 
these different methods so that future studies can benefit 
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from their refinement. 
The technique of James & Miller <1973) appears to 
have certain drawbacks. It is inappropriate for use with 
very young children who are unlikely to understand the 
meaning of the term acceptable. Furthermora, the 
descript.ion ~ as an alternative to acceptable is too 
vague: to many children ~ means 'fit.', 'healthy' or 
'recovered' (from an illness, for e:<ample>. Similarly, 
funny has the connotation of 'humorous' : a sentence may, 
however·, be semantically anomalous without being humorou.s, 
e.g. A dozen of something means eighteen. Another criticism 
of this technique is that it does not allow for a range of 
semantic acceptability : the trichotomy of 
funny/o.k., acceptable/unacceptable 
is unrealistically limited. A study by Howe and Hillman 
<1973) published in the sam~ year as that of James and 
Miller allows for a broader range of opinions in respect of 
semantic acceptability. The Howe and Hillman article will 
be discussed later in this chapter. Before this, the work 
of other researchers who adopted the James and Miller 
technique will be examined. 
Johnson and Chapman <1980> adopted the latter 
t.echnique. Child subjects were shown pictures of a "silly" 
lady and an "okay" lady. The "silly" lady says things 
"that are all miNed up" wher·eas the "okay" lady says things 
"that ar·e just fine" <1980:248>. The subjects were then 
given a number of stimulus sentences and asked to judge 
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these as having been said by the "silly" lady or by the 
"okay" lady. The authors do not provide examples of the 
stimulus sentences used. They do, however, mention that 
responses are scored as correct if they matched the probable 
<"okay"> or improbable ("silly"> designation given to the 
stimulus sentence by the experimenter <1980:249). The adult 
conception of improbable is not quite the same as the 
child's conception of "all mixed up". The latter is 
associated with a far more extreme judgment than just 
"improbable". 
It is a flaw in the research method that children are 
constrained to make 'either/or' jtidgments of sentences with 
varying"degrees of semantic anomaly. There is no room for 
the child to express reservations or to indicate gradations 
or qualifications in the opinion he is asked to make. Since 
the child is faced with a sequence of choices which is often 
lengthy, he may resort to giving hast~ or ill-reasoned 
responses simply to satisfy the experimenter and to br·ing 
the interview to an end. 
Judgments of syntactic acceptability are far more 
clear-cut than those of semantic acceptability, yet it is 
the case that researchers have used very similar and often 
identical methods to elicit both types of judgment from 
children, as shown by research done by de Villiers and de 
Vi 1 l i er· s < 1 972 > • 
In this type of test of language development, the form 
of the question put to children is critical. It c er· t a i n 1 y 
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needs to be neutral, but it also should allow children to 
qualify their judgments. This is, after all, what competent 
adult speakers of a language do, and indeed are given the 
opportunity to do. Since pre-school children are 
suggestible when it comes to mere questions of eyewitness 
testimony <Dale et al; 1978>, it follows that they might be 
even more suggestible in judgments of semantic 
. acceptabi 1 i ty. Researchers who put words in the mouths of 
child subjects are thus likely to find that children agree 
with their <the reseachers') suggestions. This likelihood, 
coupled with the f·act that an adult researcher repr·esents a 
strting authority figure in the eyes of a young child, could 
lead to children suppressing their own opinions in tests of 
semantic anomaly. It would appear to be important for 
researchers to spend more time in relaxed, natural 
conversa·tion with children. In this way, even if it is a 
time-consuming process, there should be s~veral 
opportunities to observe what children find semantically 
anomalous and how children approach problems of such 
anomaly. 
Some children evince a keen sense of semantic anomaly, 
even at a relatively young age. However, this awareness is 
often made known in naturalistic interaction between adult 
and child. Horgan t1981:223) recounts episodes of a very 
young girl <K> correcting what she finds anomalous in the 
speech of her mother <M> 
"M 
K 
You're a good cook. 
Sorry. I'm a good cookER! 
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and 
M I need to cut your hair. 
I< HairS! Sorry!" 
When a number of researchers in a given field adopt a 
particular method in their re~earch, the method tends to 
gain acceptability. It is thus developed and extended, 
sometimes without being subjected to sufficient critical 
comment. Paul <1985) used the method of James and Miller 
< 1973> Cwhi ch· Johnson and Chapman < 1980> also adopted> , 
without even a reference to these authors. In a pr·etest to 
a study of pragmatic comprehension, Paul attempted to 
establish that the subjects are able to ''make consistently 
correct judgments. about the semantic acceptabi 1 i ty" 
<1985:170) of a number of sentences. In doing so, her 
subjects were shown "pictures of two ladies, a "silly lady' 
and an 'o.k. lady'. Subjects were told that the 'o.k. lady' 
said 'o.k. things' and were given examples <A boy eats an 
apple, A ·girl rides a bike>. They were told that the 'silly 
lady' said 'silly things' and given examples of what she 
might say"(1985:169). 
It would appear that Paul has either omitted to 
acknowledge her source or has merely assumed that readers. 
know the· method being used and accept it as being correct. 
Thus, a method which is not uncontroversial is given a tacit 
st.amp of approval. One wonders in this instance what a 
later researcher working in this field would be likely to 
do. It is not far-fetched to make the assumption that the 
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method in question will grow to be used automatically in 
subsequent studies. Some suggestions regarding method for 
future research will be given at the end of this chapter. 
A noteworthy article is that by Howe and Hillman (1973) 
which appeared in the JVLVB~ In a far more open-ended 
approach , the authors asked children to descr· i be a number of 
serntences which contained a "viol.ation of semantic 
re:s,tri cti ons on the verb" ( 1973: 134). This wording was, 
however, not used in addressing the children. The author·s 
then took the children's responses and used these as 
descriptions in the remainder of the test. It is 
interesting to note that children respond in various ways to 
semantically anomalous sentences, as Howe and Hillman 
report. 
Some· of the typical descriptions the children used were 
'bad',. 'silly', 'wrong', 'stupid', 'make believe' and 
'doesn't make sense'. This range of descriptions is 
reasonably broad; certainly much broader than the silly/o.k. 
dichotomy. It makes allowance for there being a spectrum of 
semantic acceptability, with gradations from the marginally 
odd to the quite unacceptable. This spectrum is used for 
adult judgments of semantic acceptability : it seems correct 
to allow for it in the case of children as well. 
As a final comment on the use of the James and Miller 
technique, it should be borne in mind that these authors 
worked with children of two different age groups. In the 
younger age group <average age approximately five years), 
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there. was clearly less evidence of "awareness of selection 
restriction rules'' <1973:69) than in the seven-year-old age 
gr·oup. It would seem to be important for researchers to 
bear in mind the age groups with which James and Miller 
worked when a decision is made to apply their technique. It 
may be that the technique works more effectively Chas 
greater validity> in the case of older children. It is 
important that, in general, a technique used for one 
particular age group of children should not be applied 
uncritically to all age groups. 
In this chapter the issue of the use of nonsense words 
or syllables CNS> in tests of semantic: development as well 
as the issue of children's judgments of the semantic: 
acceptability of test sentences have been discussed. The 
following are the main conclusions reached in respect of 
these issues : 
1. Care needs to be taken that the use of NS does not 
confuse the child : a NS which sounds similar to a 
meaningful word may be given the same meaning or, at 
least, a similar one by the child. 
2. NS were first used in a test of syntactic: development. 
They are of dubious validity in tests of semantic 
development. Researchers need to investigate whether 
the use of NS is indeed in keeping with the aim of 
studying normal semantic: development. It would appear 
that relatively unfamiliar real words should replace NS 
in such tests. 
A research technique which appears to be useful in one 
area of LD may not be equally useful in another. For 
e~ample, the use of NS and ungrammatical sentences may 
appear useful in tests of syntactic development. 
However, similar methods do not necessarily 
"tr·ansplant" into tests of semantic: development. 
3. The use of NS in tests should be placed in perspective 
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for the child before the test begins : the child should 
be told the purpose of the test and the way in which 
th~ use of NS furthers this purpose. If the NS appear 
to do little more than confuse the child, then their 
use should be discontinued~ 
4. If many children offer· similar· e:<planations <which m'ay 
differ from the ideas of the experimenter> for a 
certain choice of interpretation, then the experimenter 
should check his ideas before proceeding. What appears 
anomalous to an adult may not be so for· a child. 
Moreover, adults may unwittingly oversimplify a 
description to the extent where it becomes inaccurate, 
e .•. g. calling a r·ob.i n a "red b i r·d" wher·e chi 1 dr·en 
perceive that it is not wholly red. 
In tests of semantic development, it is vital to take 
account of the likely world-view of the child. Both 
the child's language and his perspective on reality are 
developing and becoming more like those of the adult. 
Children and adults thus hold different perceptions of 
semantic anomaly. 
5. In adopting a research technique for assessing 
childr·en's awar·ene·ss of semantic acceptability, 
experimenters should be aware of the possible 
differences in age between the children in their test 
and the ch4ldren in the prototype test. 
6. In general, any research technique needs to be examined 
very carefully; but especially in tests of semantic 
anomaly care should be taken not to allow only 'polar' 
options. A range of semantic acceptability should be 
taken into account when testing both adults and 
children. 
7. The artificiality of NS and of certain test items may 
vitiate the conclusions of the test. Conclusions 
reached in these test conditions do not necessarily 
hold for naturally-occurring speech and therefore for 
semantic development as a whole. 
In conclusion, it is necessary to make some general 
remarks on the methods used in tests of semantic 
acceptability with children. Quite often, adults themselves 
would disagree about the acceptability of certain test 
sentences cited in this chapter. One would question why 
children should then be presented with these test items, 
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unless it were to i.nvestigate whether children displayed the 
same or similar types of disagreement than adults would. 
Regarding the use ·of the James and Miller technique, it 
appears that a number· of r·esearcher·s have adopted this 
method- without sufficient critical examination. The method 
of Howe and Hi.llman - to the extent that an experimental 
method in this. f·ield can be called .. good" - appears superior 
to that of the former authors. A recommendation to all 
those contemplating this type of test would be to allow 
subjects a wide range of classificatory options - as Howe 
and Hillman have done. 
It must again be stressed that language is a natural 
phenomenon and its development.is best studied under 
naturalistic, i.e. non-experimental conditions. Semantic 
development in particular should be studied in context, not 
by using decontextualised test sentences. Naturalistic 
studies would appear to be the only valid means of advancing 
knowledge in this field. 
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Chaoter 5 
A DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH METHODS USED TO STUDY THE 
ACQUISITION OF THE RELATIVE CLAUSE 
In this chapter, a number of research studies on the 
topic of the acquisition of the relative clause will be 
discussed. The relative clause has been selected for 
discussion since it appears frequently in the literature on 
language development. Furthermore, any discussion of 
relative clauses inevitably involves a mention of antecedent 
<nouns>, which has~relevance to semantics. Referents used 
in tests of relative clause acquisition are also often toys 
or models, which relates to the earlier discussion in 
Chapter Three o-f this thesis. Although primarily a· 
syntactic feature of languages, the relative clause also has 
important semantic aspects. It is these aspects and, in 
par.ticular, the problems associated with research methods 
which have been used to investigate them, that will receive 
attention. 
Hamburger and Crain (1982> point out that a key 
semantic aspect of relative clauses "is an assignment of a 
referent to an empty noun phrase"<246>. Typically, a 
research study of relative acquisition will attempt to test 
whether the child can assign the re-ferent appropriately. 
For example, if an experiment is designed with two identical 
marbles and the child is asked to give the experimenter the 
marble 'which is on the chair', the child would 'pass' if he 
selects correctly. If, however, he were to choose the other 
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marble which (-for example> was not on the chair but on the 
-floor, he would -fail the test. 
The apparent test o-f syntactic mastery involved here 
also includes a test o-f the understanding o-f the locative 
'on' and the word 'chair'. An obvious -flaw o-f this test is 
that the child has a 50% chance o-f passing i-f he guesses 
correctly. To allow -for the possibility o-f guessing, the 
experimenter can modi-fy the test to include more marbles (in 
di-f-ferent positions> and use di-f-ferent instructions e.g. 
Give me the marble which is on the -floor, and Give me the 
marble which is on the table. However, as will be shown 
later in this chapter when experimental conditions become 
more complicated other sources o-f error are o-ften created. 
It will be argued in this chapter that the design o-f 
experiments to test relative acquisition is extremely 
problematic, and that some such 'tests' do not really -focus 
on what they are intended to investigate. 
A crucial pre-face to any discussion o-f the relative 
clause is the distinction between the restrictive and the 
non-restrictive variety. For ease o-f reference, these two 
types will be denoted by the respective abbreviations, RRC 
and NRRC. Examples o-f these would be: 
1. Give me the marble which is on the chair. 
2. Give me the marble, which is on the chair. 
The RRC 1 would be used i-f there were more than one 
marble i.e. to remove ambiguity o-f re-ference. On the other 
hand, the NRRC 2 would be used i-f only one marble was 
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present in the room; the comment 'which is on the chair' is 
actually gratuitous. However, ~or an adult addressing a 
child, such a comment might be used to guide the child to 
the marble or even to reassure the child in some way. 
Phonetically, the distinct.ion between 1 and 2 is marked by 
the pause in 2 a~ter marble. This pause acts as ~urther 
con~irmation to the listener that the relative clause is in 
~act a non-restrictive one. 
Hamburger and Crain <1992:247) re~er to the early 
prototype relative clauses which children use. Such 
uprotorelatives", as these authors call them, place "a 
restriction on the set re~erred to in the noun phrase". As 
regards syntax, the ~orm o~ these 11 protorelatives" consists 
o~ <at least> "a verb phrase within a noun phrase" 
<1982:247). The examples given by these authors are 
interesting in that they illustrate how the child in 
question <a two-year· old girl) uses relative-like 
constructions to re-f-er to objects whose names she does not 
have in her lexicon: 
" Utterance 
1. This my did it 
2. That's a ~lush a. toilet 
3a~ Look- a my made ••• 
Re~erent 
a painting 
a toilet handle 
a toy construction" 
( 1982: 247) 
Utterance 1, "This my did it", is called a 
' 
11protorelative" because it is a paraphrase 0~ the utterance 
"This is what I did". Similarly, utterances 2 and 3a are 
paraphrases o~ "That's a thing which is used to ~lush a 
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toilet" and "Look at what I made", respectively. In all 
three cases, the child appears to lack the ability to 
construct grammatical relative clauses. 
All of the abo~e utterances are generically more akin 
to the RRC than to the NRRC, although it is nefcessary to 
know the. context of each utterance in order to interpret it 
as a relative clause. In this type of research (a 
longitudinal study of one child over a period of one year>, 
it is possible to piece together various bits of evidence 
for the acquisition of relative clause constructions. 
Unfortunately, in the other, experimental type of study, 
conclusions must stand or fall on a fairly restricted set of 
data. It is this type of study i.e. the experimental one, 
to which attention will now be given. 
A common experimental procedure for testing children's 
comprehemsi on of relative c:-1 auses is to ·ask them to act out 
their interpretation of a sentence, e.g. 
The horse kicks the man that pushed the dog. The relative 
clause is also often embedded in the main clause: 
The man that pushed the dog is kicked by the horse. In this 
type of experimental test, toy models of animals are often 
used. The child is asked to manipulate these- toys in a 
sequence which enacts the events described in the test 
sentence. This method of testing children's comprehension 
of sentences was given prominence by Carol Chomsky who used 
it in tests of syntactic development <Chomsky;1969). The 
rationale behind such tests is that they provide evidence 
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that the child actually understands the sentence <and the 
relative clause in particular> if he can provide a correct 
enactment thereof. As Hamburger and Crain <1982:251) point 
out, such sentences contain both an assertion <i.e. the 
statement in the main clause> and a presupposition <the 
information in the relative clause>. This observation 
highlights the semantic_ aspects of the test sentences. 
In their discussion of earlier research into relative 
clause, acquisition, Hamburger and Crain <1982:255> state 
that five-year-old children often appear to misinterpret the 
restrictive relative clause. Children of this age, tested 
in experimental settings, do not appear to have mastered the 
RRC. The authors put forward the view that faulty testing 
methods may actually cause children to misinterpret the RRC. 
In support of their argument, they invoke the Conversational 
Maxims enunciated by Grice (1975), speci~ically the Maxim of 
Manner, which they paraphrase as follows: 
" Manner : be perspicuQus 
a. avoid obscurity (of expression) 
b. avoid ambiguity 
c. be brief <give only necessary information> 
d. be orderly II 
( 1 982: 255) • 
With respect to submaxim a., the authors examine test 
sentences used by the experimenters Sheldon <1974> and 
Tavakolian (1978>, in which there is evidence of "the 
present tense with nonprogressive aspect" <1982:256) as in, 
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for example: 
The lion jumps over the cow that the horse bumps. 
Hamburger and Crain find that the use of this tense is 
obscure (in the Gricean sense) in that it is normally used 
in the case of "definitions and recurrent events, but is 
unnatural, hence·somewhat obscure, in the situation of 
experiments" (1982:256>. They argue that: 
"In ordinary adult conversational descriptions of on-
going non-recurrent events, the progressive is preferred 
<'Look! The lion is jumping'.)~ (1982:256). The authors 
would prefer that the test sentences be in the "infinitive 
tense" (sic): "Perhaps the experimental setting makes it 
appropriate to use stage directions, but th~n one would 
expect the infinitive <'Make the lion jump')" <1982:256>. 
The general point being made, that the choice of verb tense 
should be appropriate, would seem to apply to all 
experimental language studies of this type. It is an 
important point, and one which is not emphasised 
sufficiently in descriptions of research methods. 
Another Gricean submaxim that can be violated by test 
sentences is ambiguity. This is a general problem in all 
language tests, but one which is more serious in tests of 
language· acquisition. An examination of a number of test 
sentences reveals that there are many ways in which 
ambiguity can occur. Sheldon <1974) tested children's 
comprehension of the RRC by asking them to act out 
sentences, using toy animals. Although the sentences appear 
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simple-and clear to an adult reader, the children in 
question <aged 3 to 5 years> found difficulty in 
comprehending them. Sheldon used four sentences, which he 
labelled SS, SO, OS and 00 respectively. As described by 
Hamburger and Crain (1982:252>, the Sand 0 stand for 
subject and object <of verb and preposition> and these· 
abbreviations are used as follows: the first letter of the 
pair stands for the position o~ the matrix noun phrase that 
bears the relative clause, whereas the second letter stands 
for the position of the empty noun phrase inside the 
relative clause. In this context, the word empty means non--
occurring or implicit. In the SS example set out below; 
the noun phrase the dog would be "emp~y" since it is the 
implicit subject of jumps in the relative ~lause. The 
sentences which Sheldon used were: 
SS : .. The dog that jumps over the pig bumps into the 
lion. 
SO The lion that the horse bumps into jumps over the 
cat. 
OS : The pig bumps into the horse that jumps over the 
cat. 
00 : The dog stands on the horse that the giraffe jumps 
over. 
Sheldon used these sentences to test whether children find 
it more difficult to process sentences of the SS and SO 
va~iety, in which the main clause is interrupted by a 
subordinate <relative> clause. As Hamburger and Crain 
<1-9'82> mention, this "Interruption Hypothesis" was fi~rst 
proposed by Slobin <1966). 
Sheldon's tests actually disconfirmed this ·hypothesis, 
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since he found that children had greater difficulty in 
interpreting the OS and SO sentences. Sheldon explained 
this by making a "Parallel - Function Hypothesis". 
According to this idea, "sentences in which the same noun 
phrase is used with different, 'non-parallel', grammatical 
functions in the two clauses ·<main and relative> will be 
more difficult to comprehend than sentences in which a noun 
phrase plays the same·, 'parallel', function in the two 
clauses" (1982:252>. 
Whichever of these two hypotheses is a better 
explanation from the syntactic point· of view of children's 
misinterpretations of sentences involving the relative 
clause, the problem of ambiguity is definitely a semantic 
factor in such misinterpretations. Each of the test 
sentences contains three nouns <and hence three possible 
actors> whereas each sentence contains only two verbs. This 
is a potential source of confusion for the children, even 
more so because of the unlikely situations which are 
portrayed in the test sentences. Consider again the 
sentence: 
The dog that jumps over the pig bumps into the lion. 
Each of the animals mentioned is capable of bumping, 
and each is capable of Jumping over the others <although a 
pig would find this harder than the other two>. Thus, a 
child faced with interpreting this sentence has little in 
the way of semantic clues at his disposal. Compare the 
above sentence with the following: 
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The car that runs over the dog crashes into the wall. 
Syntactically, there is nothing to distinguish these 
sentences. However, their semantic 'structure' is very 
different. Cars run over dogs <but not vice versa, except, 
possibly in scrapyards) and cars also crash into walls more 
frequently than dogs do. It would seem, therefore, that the 
latter sentence would present far fewer problems of 
interpretation for the· child. Apart from anything else, it 
describes a sequence of events which has a far greater 
probability of occurrence than that described by the former 
sentence. Since children's language is developing slowly 
towards adult competence, it appears to be fitting that 
language tests should give preference to test items that are 
realistic. It is after all primarily the child's language, 
not his imagination or creative ability, that is being 
studied. 
As is often the case in studies of semantic 
development, researchers are quick to propose alternative 
theories to account for the apparent difficulty children 
experience with different test items. The researcher 
Tavakolian <1979) took another stance to oppose Sheldon's 
Parallel-Function Hypothesis, on the basis of data revealed 
by her own experiments. In research described by Hamburger 
and Crain (1992>, Tavakolian explained an error type which 
occurred frequently in her data as arising from "the 
children's use of a set of rules needed anyway to explain 
<their> correct interpretation of missing noun phrases in 
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conjoined clauses"<253>. Using this "Conjoined-Clause 
Analysis", she explained that, fer children, the distinction 
between ~ and sng would be lost in such sentences as: 
<1> The sheep knocks down the rabbit and stands on the 
!i9o.· 
<2> The sheep knocks down the rabbit that stands en 
the lion. 
Since children have, in any event, to infer the sheep as the 
subject of the second clause in <1>, it would be a logical 
assumption, according to Tavakclian, that a similar 
inference could result in an erroneous interpretat·ion ·of 
<2>. 
Another researcher, Legum (1975>, has what Hamburger 
and Crain think is an "intriguing explanation" <1982:254> 
for this type of error: the idea which Legum proposes is 
that -once "a child gets ahold of an animal, he tends to hang 
onto it. By this reasoning, known as the 'Bird-in-Hand 
Strategy', there would be a tendency to use the same subject 
in each clause". <1982:254). Legum's explanation may or may 
not have validity, but it does expose a potential flaw in 
the thread of method which runs through the series of 
experiments. If the acting out of their sentence 
interpretations is the only way the children are using, or 
beinq permitted to use, then the experimental method is open 
to serious question. It is this type o+ flaw in research 
method that often passes unnoticed by a series of 
investigators, resulting in a large volume of redundant 
research. 
Subsequent research indicates that quite different 
responses to OS relatives like the one that gave rise to 
Tavakolian's Conjoined Clause Analysis can be achieved by 
altering the test sentences so that the probability of an 
erroneous interpretation is reduced. Instead of using the 
sentence 
<2> The sheep knocks down the rabbit that stands on 
the lion, 
researchers used the sentence 
<3> The girl pushed the cow that bit the horse. 
A reduction in the relative number of errors of 
interpretation with <3>, compared to the number of errors 
associated with the interpretation of <2>, is reported by 
Solan and Roeper <1978>. Apart from the change in the tense 
of the verbs from present to past, the fact that girls are 
not likely <in theory> to bite horses, makes for the lowered 
probability of girl being inferred as the subject of the 
relative clause in (3). Indeed, to an adult, the 
probability of either a girl biting a horse or a sheep 
standing on a lion would be virtually zero~ However one 
views it, one is still faced, in sentence <3>, with a 
description of a highly unrealistic situation. 
It is the submission of this thesis that the contrived 
nature of tests of semantic development results in test 
items being selected which, because of their arbitrary 
properties, lack the clarity which is associated with 
sentences used in natural speech. Not only are these 
sentences removed from a natural speech context, they are 
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also often confusing because they have been chosen without 
regard for their ambiguity. They also tend to represent 
distortions of reality. In everyday speech; many sentences 
ar~ disambiguated by their context. This is not tha case in 
tests of semantic development such as the one for relative 
clause acquisition described in this chapter~ A child who 
is asked to interpret an utterance in a sequence of test 
item~ is in a comparable· position to an adult being asked to 
decode a sequence of words which, if not actually generated 
at random, show little syntactic or semantic cohesion. This 
analogy may sound extreme at first, however, normal 
comprehension occurs in a real-world context. Therefore, 
comprehension of se»te»ces i» isolatio» is not necessarily a 
valid measure of semantic competence. 
Another researcher, Goodluck (1978>, discovered that by 
reducing the number of animals in a test item from three to 
two, the comprehension of relative clauses was facilitated. 
This was achieved by either substituting a lexical item 
denoting an inanimate object for a lexical item denoting an 
animate one, or by making use of an intransitive verb. 
Sentences cited by Hamburger and Crain <1982:254> illustrate 
this. approach. 
"The dog kicks the horse that jumps up and down. 
The pig bumps into the sheep that Jumps over the fence". 
It would thus appear that, even with sentences generated in 
an artificial situation, the choice of lexical items has a 
bearing on the ease with which such sentences are 
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understood. Goodluck and Tavakolian were led, from these 
considerations, to propose "a processing - rather than a 
competence - account of children's errors in relative clause 
production", (Hamburger and Crain, ~· cit.:254>. It would 
seem that the point being made here is valid. Some 
sentences appea~ to be difficult to interpret because of the 
probability that children will incorrectly identify the 
subject of the relative clause. By reducing the number of 
nouns denoting animate objects, it may be possible to 
achieve a less obscure sentence. 
Hamburger and Crain (1982) make one of their most 
telling indictments of the "acting-cut" type tests of 
children's relative clause acquisition when they describe 
the violation of the Gricean submaxim of brevity which 
occurs in all of the tests described up to this point. In 
the experiments with toy animals, children were provided 
with only o»~ animal of each type. The use of a RRC is thus 
inappropriate to the context. For, as Hamburger and Crain 
<1982:257> point cut : "with only one horse available, the 
assertions of 17a and 17b are the same, so the relative 
clause in 17a provides unnecessary information", counter to 
the Gricean admonition to be brief : 
"17a The cow bumped the horse that tickled the cat 
17b The cow bumped the horse" <1982:257>. 
This again is clearly an instance where the sentence 
used in a test is inappropriate to the context. If only one 
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toy horse is available to the child, then the RRC that 
tickled the cat is redundant. 
However, there is potentially a greater problem than 
redundancy here. As Hamburger and Crain (1982:257> 
correctly point out, the <child) listenerreceives an 
instruction to restrict the set of potential referents 
<horses>, of which there is only one, but is unable to 
execute this instruction. This may set up considerable· 
confusion in the listener's mind and, in fact, l"endel" him 
unable to act out his interpretation of the sentence. 
The obvious change· required in the experimental method 
is to have more animals (horses> so that the child is faced 
with circumstance~ "in which the relative clause is indeed 
needed to communicate what is to be done" <Hamburger and 
Crain; 1982:257>. That one has to adapt one's method, is 
once again due to the artificial nature of the experimental 
situation. In the course of natural speech situations, the 
language used is chosen to fit the context, and not vice 
versa. This example undel"lines the need for experimenter's 
to exercise caution in test construction. One suggestion 
would be to obsel"ve a group of older children in a variety 
of communicative contexts, and to record instances where the 
RRC was used appropriately by these children. This could, 
for example, involve a child asking another to give him 
object X which has the distinctive characteristic Y. 
A similar contextual arl"angement could then be made for 
groups of younger children, and the use of RRC could be 
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noted for these groups. Preferably, experimenters would 
merely observe and record the corpus of child speech. 
However, if insufficient instances of RRC usage were to be 
found, it could then be decided to attempt to elicit RRC's 
from the· children by using suitable questions or prompts. 
Hamburger and Crain <1982:271> mention that children are 
able to use adjectives or prepositional phrases to avoid 
having to use· a RRC. They may say, for instance 11 the blue 
W; the W with the hat 11 instead of <my examples> the W that 
is blue or the W that has a hat. 
To overcome this particular problem, the authors 
suggest using referents who can only be distinguished by 
means of an act which one <but not the other> did. The 
child is then constrained to use a RRC to refer correctly to 
one or the other referent. They illustrate this by means of 
a mini-story followed by a question. It is also interesting 
to note the use of the past tense in this type of 
elicitation test. <Earlier in this chapter, reference was 
made to the past as a more appropriate tense than the 
present with nonprogressive aspect for the phrasing of test 
items on relative clause acquisition>. Here is their 
example: 
II 24. There were two brothers. One boy ate dinner and the 
other went to bed without dinner. Which boy was sad'? 
<Typical response: 'the one that didn't eat dinner.'>" 
(1982:271). 
Although this example does not provide a watertight 
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test - a child may, for example, reason that the food was 
unpleasant and therefore the boy who ate dinner was sad -
the authors nevertheless appear to have hit upon a useful 
method of eliciting a RRC. Other methods which they suggest 
include the use of a blindfold on a listener. The child 
subject. has to use language <and more particularly, a RRC> 
to convey meaningful information to the listener. Mere 
gestures <e.g. pointing> do not help in these circumstances. 
The example given by the authors is that of two identical 
animals <walruses) and a zebra. The experimenter uses the 
zebra to "tickle" one of the walruses and then instructs the 
child subject to ask the blindfolded listener <L>, to pick 
up the walrus being tickled. The experimenter might say, 
for example: 
"Tell L to pick up this one" <1982:270). 
The listener L cannot see which walrus he is being asked to 
pick up, and has to rely on an appropriate clue <which the 
authors hope will include a RRC such as : 
I 
"Pick up the walrus that the zebra is tickling" 
( 1982: 271). 
Presumably, the proximity of the agent and patient 
animals once the blindfaWon L has been removed, together 
with the verbal clue in the form of the RRC, would be 
sufficient to enable L to carry out the instruction 
correctly. However, the problem of artificiality is 
inherent in a situation like this, and it is possible that 
the child subject would not make use of a RRC. One is 
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reminded here of Chomsky's discussion of linguistic 
creativity <1959:.35>, in which he makes the point that it is 
impossible to predict utterances in a given situation. This 
feature of language causes difficulties in any type of 
research which seeks to elicit utterances from a subject. 
The authors claim- "success rates" of RRC elicitation of 
73% and 72% respectively, using the methods of mini-stories 
and blindfolds. (1982:271>. However, the methods used remain 
artificial and it is difficult to gauge whether the 
linguistic performance shown by children in such experiments 
is a reliable measure of their competence in RRC production. 
All that can be said with any confidence is that, under 
certain fairly restrictive conditions, children of a certain 
age display a certain percentage of RRC production. The 
authors admit that children as young as "under 3" have been 
observed to produce relative· <or relative-type> clauses 
spontaneously (1982:272>. Nevertheless they maintain that 
elicitation procedures are valuable : 
"standard elicitation conditions, like those here, have two 
potential advantages over reliance on spontaneous production 
: readily replicable results and greater confidence and 
precision with respect. to the meaning a child attaches to a 
relative clause" <1982:272>. 
It should, however, be emphasised that there is a 
distinct disadvantage to using a technique of relative 
clause elicitation : one's conclusions are confined to 
situati.ons which are contrived, and the "meaning" which the 
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child "attaches to the relative clause" is thus similarly 
restricted. In their quest for aggregate results and 
"success" percentages, the authors appear to have laid 
insufficient stress on the natural (often piecemeal> 
acquisition of relative clauses which appears to be the norm 
for children. 
At this point it is instructive to reflect on Hamburger 
and Crain's opening sentence (1982:245> in their article on 
relative acquisition : 
"A child can partially acquire a concept and/or the means to 
express it. One might then say that relative acquisition 
has taken place 1 relatively more than nothing, relatively 
less than everything". This facetious comment has relevance 
to the question of the study of child language: individual 
progress in acquisition is difficult to study and more 
difficult to measure. Since individual differences are 
seemingly considerable, discussion of group percentages and 
"success .. rates should be tempered by this knowledge. 
Instead of attempting to arrive at a law of 'mass behaviour' 
in such a delicate area o+ language study, it may be 
preferable to concentrate on individuals, in naturalistic 
settings, and to compare one's observations with those of 
other students of language acquisition. However, having 
made these points, one needs to acknowledge that, if 
research in experimental settings is to continue, then such 
research can only benefit from a refinement of its methods. 
Given that such research will in fact continue, one can at 
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least attempt to isolate those methods having as few obvious 
defects as possible. 
The study of relative clause acquisition reveals that 
many problems beset researchers in this area. It is vital 
that the distinction between the NRRC and- the RRC be clearly 
understood by researchers. The design of tests is difficult 
since both the context and the test sentences, being 
contrived, are often inappropriate or, at worst, ambiguous. 
It is important that consideration should be given to the 
Gricean Maxim of Manner, so that sentences are not only 
unambiguous but are also free from obscurity of expression. 
The submaxims of brevity and orderliness are also worthy of 
note. In particular, it would seem that the tense used in 
the construction of test sentences should be appropriate. 
Research methods need to be carefully scrutinised to ensure 
that a weak or faulty method is not repeated. It appears 
that researchers tend to become locked into debates over why 
subjects do better with one type of RRC than they do with 
another, without realising the importance of the contexts in 
which the diffe.rent clauses are used. 
In conclusion, the following further points should be 
noted : 
1. Tests of relative clause acquisition should be based on 
realistic situations. 
2. Naturalistic observation should be explored more 
thoroughly as a means of studying relative clause 
acquisition. 
3. Elicitation of relative cl~uses is a particularly 
difficult method of research : its validity is also 
106 
very restricted. 
4. Researchers should not become preoccupied with 
percentage results, especially in this area of language 
study. Individual differences are also important, and 
not just laws of mass behaviour, in a given situation. 
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Chapter 6 
AN ANALYSIS OF A NUMBER OF NATURALISTIC STUDIES OF LANGUAGE 
DEVELOPMENT 
, ln previous chapters, there has been a critical 
discussion of the use o~ te•ts to study Language 
d.eve.•lopment. The purpose of thi-s chapter is to examine 
other methods of s-tudying language development and semantic 
development in particular. 
Naturalistic observation of language development has a 
relatively long history, going back at least as far as the 
previous century to Sully's <1896> anecdotal accounts of 
child speech. A number of prominent students of language 
have made detai 1 ed analyses of the speech of their· own 
children, cf. for instance Burling <1959>, Leopold <1949>, 
Weir <1962>, Smith <1973) and Halliday <1975). Studying the 
speech of one's own children has the advantages of 
naturalness and both intensive and extensive observation 
opportunities. Points of disadvantage include the possible 
bias of an interested observer and the lack of replicability 
of many of these studies. The process of data-collection in 
such a study is o~ten a painstaking one. The latter feature 
of naturalistic studies has no doubt inclined researchers 
<especially those with publishing deadlines) towards the 
experimental methods discussed in earlier chapters. 
From a practical point of view, it is therefore easy to 
realise why experimental studies of language development 
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began to proliferate. Other important influences were the 
growth of cognitive psychology as a subject and the 
popularity of the use of statistical methods as part of 
general research techniques in the second half of this 
century. It is a real di~ficulty to attempt research over a 
long period on the language development of a child; if the 
child is not ana's own, the problem is greater still. The 
question of having sufficient time for such a study is but 
one of the considerations confronting someone wishing to do 
this type of research. An equally frustrating difficulty is 
that children's speech is often fragmentary, with long 
periods of silence in between. If one's research and 
observations are to be natural, then one cannot 'set up' 
situations in order to elicit a corpus of data; one has to 
depend on a naturally-occurring corpus which arises out of 
the child's normal routine. The gathering of data in such 
circumstances is a cumbersome procedure, requiring an often 
tedious sifting of what is relevant from what is not. The 
records involved can understandably become unwieldy and can 
tend to overwhelm the researcher. 
However, the sheer bulk of the task is not in itself a 
reason for turning aside : the researcher needs to weigh the 
intrinsic merit of his approach against the effort required 
to accomplish the work. It should also be realised that, in 
the past, naturalistic observation was often, if not 
exclusively, carried out by observers who did not share 
specific research goals. If a more co-ordinated approach to 
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this type of research were to be used, the data and 
conclusions of one researcher could be more readily compared 
with those of another. In short, greater co-operation 
between researchers in this mode of research would be likely 
t·o lead to improved and more frequent insights. Another 
advantage of co-opera.tion in this type of r·esear·ch is that 
it should lead to less unn·ecessary duplication of the type 
that occurs when students work separately. Time could thus 
be used more efficiently and, more importantly, researchers 
would experience mutual support. For example, a number of 
students with the single research focus of the overextension 
of the le}<ical item cup could share their observations of 
the use of this item by two-year-olds in everyday 
situations. It appears likely that a reasonable degree of 
consensus as to the use of this item would be reached in a 
relatively short period. Attention could then be given to 
another research focus by this group of people. 
At this point it is illuminating to discuss the methods 
used by a number of investigators using the naturalistic 
mode. Important similarities as well as differences in 
their respective methods will also be stressed. The area of 
emphasis will be the process which is used, rather than the 
product of an individual piece of research. In the 
concluding chapter, an attempt will be made to highlight 
those approaches which appear to be more effective from a 
research viewpoint, and also to suggest modifications in 
research procedures where appropriate. 
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One of the more recent and better documented 
naturalistic studi.es o+ semantic development was performed 
by Halliday (1975>. In this research, Halliday studied the 
semantic development of his son, Nigel, over a period of 
nine months <from the age· o+ nine months to that of eighteen 
months>. This is. a period of development which is difficult 
to study fo~ a number of reasons : the child is also 
beginning to walk <at about age one> and has a short 
attention-span, besides being not fully articulate. Much of 
the time of the child is spent with the mother, so that an 
outside observer would have to obtain the mother's 
permission to observe her child. Fortunately for Halliday, . 
this was not a problem. However, these factors need to be 
borne in mind, when this type of study is being planned. 
Halliday's study concentrated on semantic development. 
In itself, this approach is not remarkable. What is 
remarkable, however, is Halliday's distinction between an 
"adult-oriented" and a "child-oriented" per·spective on the 
way in which the child enters into "structural combinations" 
<1975:2>, whereby he puts together· linguistic "elements". 
This feature of Halliday's work is also noteworthy in that 
it makes allowance for the part played by the child in 
learning a langua~e. The child is an active and purposeful 
participant, in Halliday's view, in his own language 
development. The stress laid on the child's role has a 
natural analogue in the method used to study language 
development. Instead of setting up short synthetic testing 
sessions to study some feature<s> of the child's development 
towards one or other adult language norm, the approach taken 
by Halliday was to observe and record the child's language 
in a variety of everyday situations, over a period of time. 
These observations were then interpreted in terms of their 
relevance to the child and to the development of the child's 
linguistic system. The child is thus studied as a child, in 
his own right, and in his own world, and not as a minature 
adult. 
Halliday also stresses that his approach to the study 
of child language development is a 11 functional-
interactional11 one <1975:5>. He views the child's 
developing language as a 11 progressive mastery of a 
functional potential 11 <1975:5> in which the child comes to 
realise and use particular linguistic structures to achieve 
communicative objectives. Halliday relates the functional 
to the interactional approach via a sociological 
e:<planation. In order to achieve certain aims, the child 
uses language to (inter alia> "regulate the behaviour of 
others" <1975:5>. 
However, the approach which Halliday takes is basically 
a semantic one. He views the learning of language as the 
learning of a semantic system, but does not restrict this 
system to meanings of words only, but to a system which 11 is 
to be seen as a semantic potential. It i s a range of 
possible meanings, together with the means whereby these 
meanings are realised, or expressed" (1975:8). More 
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specifically, he states that his notion of a functional 
approach to language learning "refers to the general notion 
that the child learns language as a system of meanings in 
functional contexts•• <1975:9>. Context is therefore central 
t.o Halliday's notion of semantic development - he is 
meticulous in rela.ting the vocalisations of his son to the 
cont.ext. of utterance .• Naturalistic observations of his 
son's utterances in c.ontext constitute Halliday's r·esearch 
data. 
Halliday's essentially child-centred approach differs 
from that of many researchers working in experimental modes. 
Because of the focus on what the child is trying to achieve, 
the descriptions which Halliday uses are different from 
those common in experimental approaches. In a sense, 
Halliday rejects adult-centred labels for the child's 
lang.uage : "the child alr·eady has a linguistic system before 
he has any words or structures at all. He is capable of 
expressing a considerable range of meanings, meanings which 
at first seem difficult to pin down, be~ause they do not 
translate easily into adult language, but which become 
transparent when interpreted functionally, in the light of 
the question 'What has the child learnt to do by means of 
language?'" <1975:6>. Halliday interprets early semantic 
development as the growing ability to express a range of 
meanings rather than as the ability to utter words which an 
adult could recognise. 
Halliday allows for the development of child language 
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into adult language by postulating a three-phase system, 
thr·ough which the child's initial "functional-linguistic 
system" grows towards adult language, or competence, in 
linguistic terminology. 
In Phase I, he studies his son, Nigel, during the 
period from nine to eighteen months, which period he sub-
d'i.vi de.s. i nt.o si H s.tages of one and a half months each. Each 
such stage has a label., e.g. NL 0 stands for Nigel's 
language at 9 months, whereas NL 6 stands for Nigel's 
language at 18 months <1975:12). Of particular interest to 
this thesis is the way in which Halliday sets out his method 
of data-gathering.. Each stage of language is described, and 
Halliday stresses that, since Nigel's language "lacks both 
structure and vocabulary during these stages the word 
'description' rather than 'grammar' is used for each stage" 
(1975: 11>. 
Halliday describes his method as follows : "I made 
notes of the child's utterances, using only the traditi~nal 
equipment of the field worker, well suited to this stage, of 
notebook and pencil. I listened in, sometimes taking part 
in the situation and sometimes staying outside it, hiding 
behind doors and furniture; and I noted down any meaningful 
expression that I thought I was observing for the first 
time. Then I also noted down expressions which I considered 
to be the same as those I had observed before, not every 
time I heard them, of course, which would be impossible, but 
at fairly frequent intervals, the point being that at this 
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stag~ it is not enough to assume that because some item has 
been observed to occur it is is now part of the child's 
linguistic system•• (1975:11>. By noting down the use of an 
expression in its context· of utterance, Halliday is able to 
obtain a comprehensive perspective on his son's semantic 
development. Random vocalisations are treated as such, and 
only expressions which are consistently used in similar 
contexts are taken as evidence of semantic development. 
lt is interesting to note that, unlike many 
experimenters, Halliday makes no use of a tape recorder in 
his research. His method is simple - merely pencil and 
paper - and he manages to observe the child unobtrusively at 
times. His phrase: 11 1 listened in ..... speaks volumes for 
his method. Halliday is also selective in what he reco~ds, 
thereby avoiding an unmanageable volume of detail, which 
could present a problem of analysis. He does, however, make 
a note of the first ·instance of every expression which he 
regards as meaningful. Regrettably, the criteria for an 
e:<pression to be 11 meaningful .. , are not spelt out here by 
Halliday~ One is also made aware of the subjective nature 
of this type of method : what Halliday regards as being 
.. meaningful .. may not be so for the child uttering the 
expression. However, the balancing factor in Halliday's 
favour is that his method involves the child in everyday, 
natural situations. Furthermore, Halliday is bent on 
systematising the child's utterances, and ther·fore relates 
each occurrence of an utterance to previous instances. In 
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this way, he is able to piece together a composite 
description of the child's semantic development. 
It is instructive to take a closer look at Halliday's 
method : he chose a period of six weeks as the "optimum 
interval'' (1975:12> for separating the descriptions of his 
son's developing language. His reasons +or choosing this 
period are t.wofold : choice of a longer period would have 
resulted in "certain significant steps in the development" 
(1975:12) being omitted; whereas choice of a shorter period 
would have re.sulted in the omission of items simply because 
they had not occurred in the short period of time chosen. 
Halliday's choice of six weeks is of course arbitrary and 
his justification for this period is based on subjective 
judgments of its appropriateness. If a similar study were 
to be carried out, thought would have to be given to a 
possible revision of the length of this period. 
Furthermore, since semantic development is not necessarily 
linear growth over time at the various ages of the child 
being studied, it may be found to be suitable to have stages 
of differerit durations in such a study. 
Early in his book, Halliday continually mentions that 
the early language, or protolanguage, which he observed in 
his son differs markedly from adult language. So much so, 
that Halliday coins a number of expressions to describe the 
child's system. The main difference between the systems of 
child and adult is described as follows: 
"the system differs from the adult language system in 
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that it has no intermediate level; it has no stratum of 
grammar <we should say lexicogrammar, since this stratum 
includes vocabulary) intermediate between the meanings and 
the sounds .. <1975:.12-13). It is t·he ability to link sounds 
systematically with meanings that Halliday views as the nub 
of se.mantic:· deve·lopment at this stage of the child's gr·owth. 
Halli.da.y also distinguishes be·tween child and adult in 
t.erms of language content and language e:<pression, as 
follows:-
11the particular expressions are not, or at least may not be, 
imitations of the adult language •••• It is a system of 
vocal postures ••• which are taken up by the articulatory 
organs, general configurations rather than the specific 
bundles of contrastive phonetic: featur·es whi c:h make up the 
el ement.s of the adult sound system. 
By .analogy, we c:an make the same point about the 
content We cannot match the child's meanings with the 
elements of the adult semantic: system, which are again too 
specific:.. What is needed, in similar fashion, is a kind of 
postural notation for the content ••• The content, in other 
words, has to be specified in relation to the functions of 
1 anguage" < 1975: 13). 
It is not the central c:onc:ern of this thesis to dwell 
on theoretical considerations <and on considerations of 
phonological development in particular>. However, the 
points made above by Halliday do bear consideration, for 
they have consequences for the methods which subsequent 
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researchers into child language may choose. If one attaches 
importance to Halliday's point about the content of the 
child's linguistic system, then analytical methods which 
employ semantic features used in descriptions of adult 
languag.e may not be ent:irel y suitable for the "1 anguage" of 
chi 1 dren at the stage.s described by Halliday. On the other 
hand-, S>ince children commence their transition into a more 
adul t-1 i.ke 1 anguage at different ages, the "conventional" 
descriptions can never be too far in the background. 
Halliday is more concerned with the developmental process 
than on the product, and, since his research +ocusses 
sharply on the language development of one individual, it is 
understandable that a more fine-grained description results 
from using the less conventional developmental labels. 
One of the insights into semantic development which 
Halliday achieves in his study of his son is recognising 
that,. for an item to be part of a child's linguistic system, 
"there should be a constant relation between the content and 
the expression" <1975: 14>. Halliday refers to this 
r·equirement. as "systematicity". He gives as an example the 
item "nananana" which his son uses if and only if he 
expresses the meaning "I want that thing now" <1975:14). It 
is one of the advantages of using a naturalistic method of 
research that regularities in speech such as this one, are 
observed. Even if the child does say nananana once in the 
course of an experimental situation, the researcher may 
either gloss over the occurrence or not have the opportunity 
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to confirm what he suspects to be the meaning of this item. 
Despite the fact that children do use vocalisations like 
this, their usage is not static, and gradually a more 
acceptable <in adult terms> expression will begin to replace 
the crude prototype. The na.tural istic resear·cher has the 
advantage of being able to observe this developmental 
proc:e.ss .• 
Besides his requirement of systematicity, Halliday also 
proposes the requirement of "functionality" - this is taken 
to mean that "the content should be such that it can be 
interpreted by reference to a prior established set of 
functions" (1975:15>. By "function" in this context, 
Halliday means "one or other of the things that the child is 
making language do for him" <1975:15>. 
This requirement is the cornerstone of Halliday's 
theory of semantic development. After reflection on the 
"1 anguage" of his son, he hypothesi sed a number of 
"functions" which, although they refer to the communicative 
context in which the child finds himself, are more general 
in scope and have applicability to adults as well. 
According to Halliday <1975:16>, social man is served by 
language in that it enables him to interact with his fellows 
in a number of different ways. Halliday's various 
observations of his son in communicative contexts provided 
him with a keen insight into how the child, despite his lack 
of "adult" language competence, managed to use his speech to 
a number of general ends. By being able to observe and 
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reflect on the vocalisations of his child as they occurred 
in a natural context, Halliday was able to connect the 
expressions which Nigel used to the communicative needs of 
the situation, especiall.y in the case of semantic 
development. Halliday is careful to distinguish between his 
son's semantic potential at a given developmental stage and 
his "total semiotic potential" which Halliday defines as 
"the information system that is embodied in the whole of the 
child's behaviour" <1975:23>. Halliday's method of 
naturalistic observation is well suited to his purpose of 
studying his son's semantic development: he is able to 
relate linguistic aspects to non-linguistic behaviour <like 
body-language). 
It is not in place to discuss the various functions of 
langua9e to which Halliday refers - these are properly the 
domain of sociolinguistics and beyond the scope of this 
thesis. What is more relevant is to look carefully at 
Halliday's method of studying Nigel 1 S speech. 
Halliday mentions that his soM, in at least one 
instance, used a sound which he <Nigel> made in his pre-
sleep vocalisations "as having the meaning of withdrawal, 
and more specifically 'I'm sleepy' ••• "<1975:23-4>. Thus, a 
naturally-occurring sound, made by the child himself, became 
a unit in the child's linguistic system. Another astute 
observation by Halliday is that Nigel, at about the age of 
18 months, would use certain items in contexts of 
"observation, recall and prediction"<1975:27>. Nigel would 
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recall a word he had used· up to three weeks previously, and 
also use words to refer to objects which he was expecting to 
see <while out walking, ~or instance). At this age, a large 
number of object names appeared to enter Nigel's vocabulary. 
Because Halliday was able to study his son's speech over a 
lonq period, and was not constrained by a series of 
interviews of fixed length, he was· abLe to make observations 
about Nigel's ability to use wor·ds in a situation of recall 
or predicting. This is a ~urther argument ~or the 
naturalistic method of research, especially in the case of 
semantic development. 
Halliday's method also enabled him to study the 
transition from Nigel's use of his own linguistic system to 
that of adults. Two important points emerge from this 
study: 
(a) Halliday noticed the stage at which Nigel began to 
use language to in~orm his listener. Nigel used the 
inter·rogative form "to convey infor·mation that he knew 
the hearer did not possess" and the declarative form 
to comment on something which was already known to the 
hearer (1975:32>. 
<b> There is an account of how Nigel uses language in phase 
with his construction of a social system (1975:121) and 
how, in particular, his developing concept of time is 
related to his use of the names of days of the week. 
Both of these points are illustrated by eNamples which 
Halliday provides of the spontaneous speech of the child. 
There is no need to design an artificial situation : the 
developing language reveals itself in situations of everyday 
life. More particularly, Nigel's semantic system develops 
in response to his needs as a social being. 
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Hal.liday places his study in the context of other 
studies in linguistics, and of child language in particular. 
He has developed the ideas of Brown· on the "'rich 
inter·pre.tation' of children's language"(1975:3) and Fillmore 
on case grammar <1975:4). For his sociolinguistic theories 
he has borrowed from the work of Bernstein <1971,1973> and 
certa,in of his descriptive techniques are derived from Firth 
<1975:7>. For Halliday, the social-interactional model of 
language development is pivotal to his theory - he views 
cultural acquisition as the milieu of language acquisition. 
Unlike other researchers, Halliday does not make 
frequent comparisons between the language of his son and 
that of other children. This is because his chief concern 
is the construction of a general theory of semantic 
development based on his own observations of Nigel's speech. 
It would have been interesting had Halliday been able to 
apply his theory to the language of children other than 
Nigel. Nevertheless, his work stands out as a naturalistic 
study of child language and will provide future researchers 
with sound empirical data on which to proceed. It 
represents a milestone in the overall study of child 
language. 
In a far less intensive longitudinal study of the 
language development of one child than that of Halliday, 
Burling (1959) gives an account of how his son Stephen 
developed bilingualism in English and Garo, an Indian 
language. Burling brought his family into a Garo-speaking 
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environment when his son was sixteen months old, and the 
family spent two years there.. It is interesting to note 
that Stephen was at the one-word stage in English when he 
came into regular contact with Garo. As Burling (1959:45) 
points out, Garo words rapidly entered his son's vocabulary, 
eventually overtaking the English words in number. There 
was thus a rapid period of lexical acquisition of Garo 
brought about by th~ new environment. 
Burling (1959~46> ascribed the predominance of Garo to 
the fact that Stephen's mother was in hospital for about two 
months, when Stephen was about 1;9 years of age. This 
environmental factor was also made more influential by his 
father speaking to him frequently in Garo and the fact that 
eve.n after· his mother·'s hospitalisation, her illness "for·ced 
him into greater contact with Garos ~han might otherwise 
have been the case"(1959:46>. Equally, however, the removal 
of his son from contact with Garos at the end of the 
Burlings' stay in India resulted in Stephen rapidly losing 
his fluency in Garo with the result that, within six months 
of leaving India, Stephen was "even having trouble with the 
simplest Garo words"<1959:63>. 
Burling was able to keep detailed records of Stephen's 
speech for the first eighteen months of their two-year stay 
in India, concentrating his attention on phonetics and 
morphology, but commenting on semantics as well. He 
mentions a number of difficulties that are associated with 
the study of child language, among which are "the poverty of 
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the children's vocabulary'' and "the difficulty of getting 
them to repeat forms''C1959:45>. On the positive side, 
Burling mentions that both child and parent enjoy the close 
interaction that such a study involves. It is also 
illuminating: to consider nonlinguistic effects, such as the 
absence of the mother, on the child's language development. 
Burltng also refers to an interesting aspect of Stephen's 
language development in that during his sleep he would speak 
in Garo, not in English <1959:63>. It is this type of 
observation that can only be made in a naturalistic study of 
language development, experimental methods invariably 
involve the speech of children who are awake. By failing to 
capture child language in all its possible modes, an 
experimental study can at best give only a partial account 
o~ such language. 
Regarding his son's semantic development, Burling 
points out that this tended to lag behind both phonetic and 
syntactic development. Stephen used "several numer·al 
classifiers in Garo quite readi.ly'' <1959:60> as well as 
"color terms in both English and Garo'' <1959:61) without 
showing much understanding of the terms he was using. 
Although he was Ltsi ng "col or· terms" as ear 1 y as 1; 10, it was 
only about a year later, at 2;9, that he began to use these 
terms appropriately. According to Burling (1959:61> the 
grasp of the correct meaning of these terms occurred 
suddenly. 
Stephen's use of spatial terms was more precise than 
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his use of terms denoting time, at corresponding ages. 
Burling <1959:61) also mentions the onset of metalinguistic 
awareness in his son at the age of 2;9: 
"He. would occasionally start to speak, pause, point to 
something, and ask wats dis; receiving an answer, he would 
proceed· to use the. word in his sentence. 11 Although Stephen 
was- awar·e that he was using words, some usages were sti 11 
incorrect. Burling was able to play a type of translation 
game with his son at this stage, in which Stephen would 
supply the Garo equivalent of an English word or vice versa. 
The bilingualism displayed by Stephen is ascribed by 
his father to the influence of his Garo caregiver who 
brought him into contact with other Garo speakers, even on 
their stay in Gauhati whi.ch is outside the Garo Hills. Here 
<1959:62> Stephen showed considerable shyness when in the 
company of non-Garo speakers. On their return t.o the Garo 
Hills, Stephen spent much more time in the company of his 
mother, which resulted .. in an explosive expansion of his 
ability in English 11 (1959~62>. The tendency shown by Stephen 
to seek out the company of someone who coald ~peak a 
language he understood, says much for the process of 
language development. It highlights the importance of the 
linguistic environment for a child who is, at an obviously 
receptive age, responding to a language which he hears 
consistently, in normal usage. More than this, the 
influence of linguistic environment <and the child's 
sensitivity thereto> raises questions about language tests 
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that are given to children on a one-off or random basis in 
strange environments. Whereas the method of naturalistic 
observation is able to take account of changes in the 
routi.ne of the child and his responses to these changes, the 
e:<perimental research mode is far less sensitive to the 
ef·fect which the changed environment has on the 1 anguage of 
the chil.dren being tested. 
On~ of the purported advantages of an experimental test 
of language development is that it enables some general 
hypothesis to be tested with a reasonably 1 ar·ge number of 
children. Such tests can be replicated by other researchers 
to confirm or disconfirm the conclusions reached previously. 
In other words, it allows for a large number of comparisons 
to be made among children with respect to language 
development. With naturalistic research, direct comparisons 
of this type are lacking; however, there is still the 
possibility of some fruitful comparisons between research 
findings. Burling is able to make useful comparisons 
between the phonetic development of his son and the patterns 
of such development suggested by earlier researchers, 
notably Jakobsen and Halle, and Velten <1959:64>. Burling 
is also able to use his findings to disagree with Leopold on 
certain of the latter's views on child language, in 
par·ticular Leopold's view that "synta:< comes before 
morphology" <1959:65). Burling found that in Stephen's 
development of Gar·o, both synta:< and morphology developed 
simultaneously <1959:66>. Despite the fact that Stephen 
borrowed a number of English morphemes into Garo, "there was 
seldom any question as to which language he was using since 
affix morphology and syntax were either all Garo or all 
English"<1959:67). 
In summary, it can be said that Burling's account of 
his son's language development is a perceptive one. It is 
not at all comprehensive, since it has phonetics and syntax 
as its f,ocus more· than 60% of his article is devoted to 
these topics and only three paragraphs are given to 
semantics. However, he has rendered a detailed account of 
the topics which appeared to be of primary interest to him, 
and he has tested the theories of other resear·chers, by 
comparing his observations with their predictions. More 
importantly, he has conducted his observations in the 
natural context of his son's growth, with interesting 
comments on the effect of Stephen's mother's presence <or 
absence> on the child's language development. This factor 
is a potentially crucial one for the study of language 
development, with mothers in modern times tending to go out 
to work more, and leaving their young children in the care 
of others. Experimental studies are not able to delve into 
this area of research in anywhere near the same depth as a 
continuous naturalistic study. 
Brown et al, in Bar-Adon and Leopold <1971), describe a 
longitudinal study of three children, Eve, Adam and Sarah 
over differing stages of language development. The 
interesting feature of this research was the simultaneous 
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study o~ the respective parental utterances which had been 
addressed to these children. Although this study was 
primarily syntactic, and was done in the aftermath of 
Chomsky's early published work on syntax <Chomsky 
1957,1965>, the consequences for research method into child 
language as a whole are worthy of consideration. The 
authors stress that. in any grammatical study the role of 
interpretation is crucial : the mere recording of 
spontaneous speech is only the first step towards knowledge, 
a knowledge which ''is worked out from spontaneous speech by 
a process of inference that is far from being mechanical or 
certainly correct. The process is something like trying to 
fit together the pieces of an immense jigsaw puzzle and 
not at all like the process of doing experiments in a 
psychological laboratory" <1971:384). 
This latter point is a telling one : the authors are 
saying that knowledge in the realm of grammar <which is one 
aspect of language> is obtained by analysis of a wide 
variety of details, and by attempting to find links between 
different sections of a corpus of data. Such knowledge is 
not obtained by attempting to control the variables in a 
language situation as one would try to control variables in 
a psychological <or other scientific> type of experiment. 
There is no straightforward application of method, result 
and conclusion to this realm of knowledge; instead there is 
a painstaking process of inference based on the 
consideration of data. It would be appropriate to extend 
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these authors' argument and to claim that the data for 
analysis, if it is to be used to construct a theory of 
<natural> language, should be obtained from the study of 
children in naturally-occurring circumstances. It is 
difficult to argue for the extension of experimental methods 
o~ studying language development if these methods exclude 
th~ possibility of linguistic naturalness. 
Another well-annotated study of language development 
using the longitudi.nal naturalistic method is that of Kaper 
< 1985). •:::aper kept re.ccrds of the speech of his two sons, 
Erik <E> and Hans <H>, for approximately si:< years in the 
case of Erik <1;11 to 8;2> and just over four years in the 
case of Hans <1;7 to 6;0>. The interesting aspect of 
Kaper's research is that he concentrated on recording 
utterances which deviated from standard adult use. In fact, 
•<aper· stresses <1985:4> that in his opinion, "there is no 
essential difference between child language and adult 
language and that the proper method of studying "child" 
language is to compare it frequently with "adult'' language. 
Also interesting from the point of view of this thesis is 
that Kaper devotes considerable space to. a discussion of 
semantic development. The context of the study is Rotterdam 
and the language used by E and H is Dutch. 
Kaper addresses one of the interesting problems in the 
study of semantic development, viz. to what extent do 
children acquire a language by imitating adult speech and to 
what extent do they form their own hypotheses about the 
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target language. He mentions the individual differences 
between his own sons E and H in their attempts to acquire 
Dutch. H used to ~parrot nearly all the words he heard 
<also when not addressed to him>,. without paying attention 
to· the meaning. E never did, on the contrary, he refused to 
repe,at words when he was prompted to do so • • • Apparently he 
did~ not spea·k the words before he felt sure of the right 
pronunciation'' <1985:8>. This observation has important 
consequences for experimental work on child language; if 
correct, it may explain in part why certain children are 
unresponsive in a test situation. .Reticence may not refl.ect 
a lack of competence; on the contrary, a child who is trying 
to speak in close conformity with adult speech may simply be 
holding back certain words or phrases until he feels 
confident about uttering them. 
Kaper relates his observations on the semantic 
development of his son <E> to those of other researchers. 
In the chapter entitled Container and contents he describes 
E's use of the morpheme QQ to express absence as well as to 
refer to an empty container. He e:<plains E's "deviant" use 
of QQ by saying that, to a child, this component could be 
taken to mean either the food or drink which had been in the 
now empty container gc the empty container itself. For 
t<aper, "in the child's mind the reference is rather vague", 
and he <l<aper> refers to the analogy of "semantic fog~ used 
by other researchers <Leopold and Barrett> and also the view 
of Vygotsky on the child's thought processes (1985:11). 
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Kaper also notes that both his sons used the word leeg 
<empty> synonymously with the sense of .!22. in Standard Dutch, 
"expressing that the contents of a container are finished" 
< 1985: 11 >. However, his son H appeared to use the wor·d ~ 
<the antonym of le.e.g> to refer to the contents, and not the 
container (1985: 12> and <1985:E:<amples; 1>. However, as H 
grew, older he was able to distinguish between reference to 
container and r•e.f·erence to contents. Kaper mentions that H 
jokingly took some chocolates out of their dish and handed 
them over, when asked for· "the chocolates" < 1985: 12>. Kaper 
cites the example of the phrase "the matches" which in 
normal adult usage refers to the container plus its contents 
(1985:12>~ In passing, Kaper mentions the deviant use of 
the plurals of mass nouns by his children but notes also his 
own deviant use of the plural tandapasta's <toothpastes> in 
conversation with his wife <1985:12>. This observation 
accords with his general argument that child language has no 
separate existence - it is, for Kaper, essentially the same 
as adult language. 
In discussing his children's use of adverbs of time, 
Kaper (1985:14) finds that both E and H use gister<en> 
(yesterday) to refer to the past, but not necessarily to the 
previous day. Although Kaper does not· mention it here, 
adult speakers also use phrases in which time reference is 
inexact. In South African English the phrases just now and 
the other day are cases in point : the former could be used 




the latter could refer to an event which occurred up to a 
wee~ prior to the time of speaking. Although his children 
u~ qister<en> in an inexact way, it is only the degree of 
pexactitude that is apparent. Like their deviant use of 
container words, it is this vagueness which shows the 
f 
/ incomplete development of their semantic systems~ However, 
it is i.nteresting to note that adults also use phrases 
having vague reference, so that this "deviance" appears in 
/ 1 language across a spectrum of ages. Once again, Kaper 
compares his observations with those of other investigator-s, 
and although he acknowledges that his are not new, they "may 
contribute to extending the mater·ial already collected by 
others•• (1985:15). This statement underscores the strength 
of the method of naturalistic observation of language 
development : knowledge accrues from the cumulative effect 
of the observations of different observers. Similar 
observations are thus able to be taken as being mutually 
confirmatory. In experimental tests of language development 
one also finds similar observations, but these are not 
observations made about naturally-occurring language, and 
thereby lack the generality of the naturalistic studies. 
Kaper (1985> has an interesting chapter on the 
antonymous use of words by children. By this he means the 
use of a word by a child in a situation in which an adult 
would use the antonym of that word, e.g. using the word hot 
when touching a cold object. Kaper noticed this use in a 
child as young as 1;7. He also records the antonymous use 
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of deictics like compounds of komen <come) and gaan <go). 
However, Kaper mentions that children frequently use words 
antonymously as well as correctly and, in fact, he is not 
able to cite a word which he observed a child to use wolely 
in an antonymous way. By regular observation of his own 
children Kaper is able to discern patterns in their 
antonymous use of words, as when, E uses zoeken <'look for') 
meaning vinden ('find'>, but also uses vinden in appropriate 
contexts (1985:55>. Nine days later, Kaper notices that E 
uses zoeken to mean'''meeting a person at the railway 
stat i on ' " ( 1 985: 55 > • Although this use is idiosyncratic, 
Kaper is able to make comparisons between the speech of E 
and Leopold's daughter Hildegard <1985:56). In E's case, he 
uses vinden in "Zal ik hem vinden" whereas Hildegard 
<speaking in German> says "Sell ich's mal finden". Both 
sentences have the English equivalent Shall I find it? 
Here, once again, naturalistic observations are a fruitful 
source of comparison in the study of semantic development. 
Kaper uses his observations and those of other 
researchers to frame two hypotheses about the use of 
antonymous words by children <and, as he also points out, by 
adults>. His first hypothesis is that speakers, when 
searching for a particular word, may latch on to its 
opposite because somehow the antonym is associated with the 
word being sought "It is as if they ar·e scanning a 
semantic field in which among other things words are 
associated with each other because they are opposites" 
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<1985:62>. His second hypothesis is that "in children the 
discrimination of word-meanings is initially very hazy : the 
'semantic fog' clear·s away in the course of time" 
(1985:64>. In fact Kaper concedes that semantic: development 
may never be taken as complete, but should rather be viewed 
a·s a "continuous process" <1985:64), continuing into 
adulthood. 
On reflection, Kaper's studies are very valuable, even 
though he concentrates on two children. He points out 
important similarities between the speec:h of his children 
and that of other children in the literature. He also shows 
that many of the deviant forms whic:h children use are 
analogous to errors which adults make and are, in any event, 
deviant only insofar as they are not in line with the norm 
of the particular language. They do, nevertheless, reveal 
that the chi 1 dren are "making use of a potentiality i nher·ent 
in the language'' (1985:101>. Their errors are therefore not 
non-1 anguage but mer·el y "i ncorrec:t" 1 anguage. The form used 
by the child c:an usually be traced back "to a potential form 
in his mother tongue'' <1985:101>. This adds weight to his 
argument that child language is a language whic:h does not 
exist in its own right - it is, in essenc:e, no different 
from adult language. 
Kaper's study of the language development of his sons 
is of a different kind to the studies of Halliday and 
Burling discussed earlier in this chapter. However, where 
Kaper has said little about research method, he has recorded 
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a commendable number of example sentences - 419 - in the 
appendix to his book. These example sentences are grouped 
thematically and the exact age of the child concerned in 
each case is g.iven in years, months and days. Like Burling, 
he has compared his observations with those of other 
s·.tudents of child language, and he has also given much 
contextua.l information. Although he has not written a 
grammar of child language• as Halliday did, he shares 
Halliday's child-centred approach and is able to display 
great empathy for children in his interpretation of their 
utterances. All points considered, Kaper has made a 
significant contribution to knowledge in r·espec:t of semantic 
development. 
It is regrettable that these excellent naturalistic 
studies of language development, with their unique insights 
into the way in which children use language, were not 
published earlier, so that the advantages of their methods 
could have become apparent sooner. It is still not too late 
for other researchers to take note of these advantages and 
to incorporate as many as possible in future research. What 
is apparent from reflection on the research discussed in 
this chapter is the powerful influ~nce of the child's 
environment - both linguistic and extra-linguistic - on his 
language development. It is this total environment, with 
the watershed moments it contains for language development, 
which are accessible to the naturalistic researcher. Those 
involved in experimental studies can catch little more than 
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glimpses thereo~. 
In the concluding chapter of this thesis, consideration 
will be given to ways in which the gulf between naturalistic 
and experimental studies can be narrowed. This question is 
naturally a problematic one; access to children for 
sufficient period~ of time being the greatest difficulty. 
However, if child language studies are to be improved, it 
seems clear that those using exclusively experimental means 
will need to modify their methods. 
In the concluding chapter, attention will be given to 
the question of the study of semantic development in 
general. Researchers need to place this study within the 
perspective of l.anguage study as a whole, and, in 
particular, to assess the profitability of the study of 
semantic development <of children> in is6lation from the 




This thesis set out to analyse the existing research 
methods in language development studies, with particular 
reference to semantic development. In the course of this 
thesis,- other aspects of· the study of language development 
have been discussed. In this concluding chapter, an attempt 
will be made to draw together the strands of the various 
arguments and to indicate the importance of these arguments 
to the study of language development as well as to the study 
of semantics. 
This chapter will be divided into five parts, as 
follows: 
1. Analysis of methods used in experimental studies 
of lan~uage development. 
2. Analysis of methods used in naturalistic studies of 
language development. 
3. Comparison of the methods discussed in parts 1 and 2 of 
this chapter. 
4. Recommendations for future research into language 
development, with respect to research method. 
5. Implications of the findings of this thesis for the 
study of semantics. 
1. Analysis of methods used in experimental studies of 
language development 
In the second chapter of this thesis, there was a 
discussion of the artificial nature of the situations 
in which tests of language development are 
administered. There are many facets to this 
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artificiality but it is as well to consider a general 
point. Language is a natural phenomenon and develops 
in humans in the course of the natural overall 
development of the speaker. It is a phenomenon which 
not only occurs in context but which is also bound to 
context. Tests of language development do more than 
test the 1 anguage o.f a chi 1 d - they actually involve 
the creation of a co~text for the language which is 
being tested. The central question is whether, within 
the boundaries of this non-natural context, the 
language being used by the testee can be viewed as 
natural and thus as representative of the language 
which he uses in other, <i.e. the majority of>, 
situations. In short, are experimental tests of 
language development valid? 
In Chapter Two, the factors which tend to 
invalidate the results of these tests were discussed in 
detail. There would appear to be a number of physical 
and psychological factors which affect the results of 
these tests. Chief among the physical factors are the 
strange apparatus <tape-recorders, videotape cameras 
and even notebooks> which interpose themselves between 
the interviewer and the child. In a sense, these 
instruments become silent participants in the test 
itself, and as such may prove to be a source of 
distraction from the language focus of the test. Then 
there is the interviewer, often a stranger to the 
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child, and definitely someone with whom the child ought 
to feel a rapport before the latter will begin to speak 
at all, le.t alone in a natural way. If tests of 
language development are to show even a marginal 
vali.dity, then the interviewer must at least allow for 
a rea\sonable per·iod of fa.mi li arisati on between himself 
and the. child being test.ed. This f·actor will be 
discussed again in more detail. 
Ohe psychological factor is the anxiety level of 
the child in the test situation, which may be related 
to the demands which he perceives to be inherent in the 
test. <This factor will no doubt vary from one age-
group to another>. Tests of long duration tend to 
induce boredom as well as fatigue in child subjects, 
especially in the case of younger children. There 
would seem to be no standardisation of test duration 
with respect to the age of child subjects. Having 
regard to the boredom/fatigue factor it would seem 
desirable to impose a reasonable upper time limit on 
tests, at each age. 
If the interviewer is male, this factor, too, 
could influence the results of the test, since most 
children of the ages often being tested are more 
accustomed to hearing their mother's voice than that of 
anyone else. Indeed, the absence of their mother from 
the test situation may be a disturbing factor for very 
young chi 1 dr·en. 
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Reference was made in Chapter Two to the 
Observer's Paradox whi~h has an influence on the 
outcome of language tests. In the case of children in 
particular, the relationship between interviewer and 
subjects i.s a. delicate one. There is i nsuf f i ci ent 
knowledge as to the e>~tent of the influence of a non-
mat:ernal observer on the performance of children in 
1 angua-ge tests. Up to now the possible negative 
effects of an outside observer on test outcomes appear 
to have been overlooked to a large extent. Elliot 
<1981> fails to mention the drawbacks of experimental 
studies of linguistic development in the chapter of her 
book, Child Language, dealing with this topic. The 
closest she comes to a cautionary note is to state that 
an experimental study attempts to probe "the natural 
course of development, without intending to interfere 
with this development in any way" <1981: 110>. It 
remains the contention of this thesis that the mere 
presence of a strange observer detracts from the 
naturalness of an interview situation, and thus also 
diminishes the possibility of obtaining natural 
linguistic data in such a situation. 
In Chapter Three, there was an analysis of the 
materials used in a number of tests of language 
development. The main point being made in that chapter 
was that materials which are artificial and often <very 
poor> models of real objects, may be unsuitable for use 
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in test.s of semantic development. In particular, the 
rows of garage-like structures, specially designed for 
use in a test situation by Donaldson and McGarrigle 
<1974>, bear little resemblance to the objects denoted 
by the lexical item garages. Since the objects used in 
the. t.e.st were not real garage.s, tl':le authors are not 
con.si.stent. in their· use o.f· t.ermi nol ogy, and use words 
like garages and garage spaces interchangeably. 
Similarly, the test designed by Charney (1979> to 
study deictic comprehension, in which a number of means 
of transport are used in an unusual context, has a 
number of artificial aspects. The test seeks to probe 
the understanding of perspective, yet the method of 
using objects whose size <as models> is out of 
proportion to their real dimensions is distinctly odd. 
An inaccuracy in research design such as the use of 
different distances of object models from the 
part·i ci pants in the test <when such distances ought to 
be equal> is also a feature which tends to weaken test 
validity. It appears that, in tests which are 
constructed to test linguistic development, researchers 
tend to concentrate too much on the language aspect 
alone, and neglect the considerations of artificiality 
or inaccuracy in the physical conditions which they 
impose on the test. 
The use of toys and models in general as part of 
tests of semantic development is questionable •. As a 
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yardstick of semantic development, that is, as a 
measure of how advanced children are towards achieving 
semantic c.ompe.tence, the use of tests involving· toys 
and models seems inappropriate. By referring to toy 
dogs a•s dogs or to garage models as garages we are, as 
adult·s·, not indulging i.n everyday adult speech. 
Although~ as adults, we are aware of the distinction 
between models and the objects which they represent, it 
is not necessarily the case that children in general 
perceive this distinction in a similar way. In order 
to obtain a more accurate impression of children's 
semantic development towards <adult> competence, it 
would be preferable to design tests involving real 
animals or r·eal garages. 
The fourth chapter of this thesis deals with the 
type of language used in studies of semantic 
development, and the use of nonsense syllables <NS> in 
particular. A criticism similar to that mentioned in 
the previous paragraph is pertinent here. Wher·eas 
adults generally recognise NS as such, children may 
react with confusion when confronted with NS. The 
whole question of what is real for the adult versus 
what is real for the child looms lar·ge in this type of 
test. Since adults do not normallY use NS in everyday 
speech, it seems out of place for NS to be used in 




In respect of tests of semantic anomaly, the use 
of polar options is not a reflection of reality, with 
its subtle gradations. Children who perceive such 
subtleties ought to be given choices of ways in which 
the express, them. It is also quite possible for 
experimenters· t:o overlook alter·native <equally 
pl.au.sible> i.nterpret.a-t.ions of sentences in these tests. 
Once again, the respecti.ve emphases of perception of 
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adults and children need to be recognised and studied. 
It would appear that a valid, 11 age-f r·ee 11 test of 
semantic anomaly is a difficult aim to achieve. 
In Chapter Five, there was a critical discussion 
of research methods used in the study of relative 
clause acquisition. In the course of that chapter it 
was emphasised that, in the design of test sentences, 
various Gricean conversational submaxims should be 
observed, particularly those of clarity, brevity and 
orderliness. An important criticism of the tests 
mentioned in that chapter is that they are often based 
on unrealistic situations, such as making toy pigs jump 
over toy lions. It was also pointed out that 
elicitation of relative clauses is difficult to 
achieve. The general point was also made that 
researchers, often keen to quantify their results, tend 
to overlook individual differences between childran. 
It is these diffe~ences, and the reasons which give 
rise to them, that are a fertile area for further 
research. Later in this chapter there wi 11 be a. 
summary of the main criticisms of experimental tests of 
language development, and tests of semantic development 
in particular. 
2. Analysis of methods used in nat.uralistic studies of 
language development 
In: Chapt·er Si.x, a number· of naturalistic studies 
o~ semantic development were discussed. The work of 
Halliday, in particular, in studying the developing 
language of his son, has provided a sound alternative 
to the plethora o+ experimental studies of LD. 
Halliday was able to detect and describe trends in his 
son's LD because of· the intensive yet relatively 
unobtrusive manner in which he went about his work. 
Halliday also demonstrated an ability to systematise 
his observations and to relate groups of observations 
made at di f·ferent stages of his son's development. 
By studying his son in naturally-occurring 
situations over a relatively long period, Halliday was 
abl~ to present a truly developmental account. He was 
able to distinguish the relevant and the consistent 
from the purely random elements in the corpus of his 
son's vocalisations. Halliday's study was path-
breaking in the sense that he attempted to portray a 
child-centred perspective on language. He was able to 
take this approach because of the long periods of 
careful research which he undertook. However, Halliday 
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was also care~ul enough to provide, in his theoretical 
framework, for a transition from the child-centred 
perspective on language to an adult-centred one, i.e. 
linguistic competence. 
Specifically, with r~gard to semantic development, 
Ha1l.i.day descri.bes how the child becomes aware of the 
~unctions o~ languag~, and 1~ able to exploit the 
p.otential in language t·o convey meaning. Halliday also 
refers to the need, in th~ child's linguistic system, 
for there to be a systematic relation between the 
content and the expression. Because he was able to 
observe his son continually in similar situations, 
Halliday was able to isolate this aspect of his son's 
developing language. 
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One of the most cogent reasons for acknowledging 
Halliday's contribution to language development 
I 
research as an effective one, is that he linked LD 
closely in his theory with the growth of the child as a 
social being. T~e sociolinguistic dimension of 
Halliday's work is fascinating. In constructing this 
aspect of his theory, he refers to the work of a number 
of other researchers in the field of sociolinguistics. 
It would be interesting to compile a number of reports 
of naturalistic observation of semantic development 
made in the Halliday 'mould'. Whatever the 
shortcomings of his theories may be, it is correct to 
hold that his overall approach and painstaking 
observations set a standard +or future students in the 
field. 
Burling's account of his observations of his son's 
LD is different from that of Halliday both in its 
nature and in its scope. Burling's son experienced a 
relat·ively disrupted ear·ly childhood, with periods of 
enforced absence from his mother and with changing 
degrees of exposure to English and Garo in the first 
3 1/2 years of his life. Burling documents the effects 
of these changes on the LD of his son, and also gives 
an account of his son's language during sleep. Burli·ng 
mentions some of the difficulties inherent in the study 
of child language, chiefly the paucity of the material, 
or speech corpus, which the researcher is able to 
record. He also notes stages in his son's semantic 
development, particularly with respect to the use of 
colour terms, spatial terms and to metalinguistic 
awareness. Having been able to study his son's LD in a 
natural context for about two years, Burling is in a 
strong position to see this development in an 
integrated way and to note, in particular, the 
influence of important environmental factors. 
Brown et al, in their important case study of 
three children, come out strongly in support of the 
importance of inference and interpretation in the study 
of child language. The type of analysis of the speech 
of children which these authors advocate is essenti~lly 
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one which lacks experimental controls, but one in which 
• 
a wide-ranging study of spontaneous speech is given 
prominence. 
Fin·ally, l·<aper, in his longitudinal research into 
the language of his sons, puts forward the tenet that 
child and adult language are essentially similar. 
Kaper makes extensive use of so-called "deviant" for·ms 
in chi td 1 anguage to fur·ther· his ar·gument that this 
language is far closer to adult language than many 
theor·i s:ts would concede. He maintains that many adults 
exhibit linguistic deviations which do not differ much 
from those which children reveal. From the point of 
view of semantic: development, Kaper's research is 
intere.sti.ng in that it highlights aspects such as the 
usage of te~poral adverbs and container words as well 
as dwelling on the antonymous use of words by his 
children. Kaper's research is extremely thorough and 
we 11-doc.umen ted. He has taken pains to compare his 
f i.ndi ng_s with those of other researchers, and thus 
succeeds in making his central argument stronger. 
Above all, like the other researchers already mentioned 
in this chapter, his focus is sharply on the child, and 
on the child's semantic development in the conte:<t of a 
broader social growth. It is once again this holistic 
approach to the study of child language which provides 
linkages between various stages of development as well 
as between the child's milieu and his language withi» 
that milieu. 
3. Comparison of the methods discussed in parts 1 and 2 of 
this chapter. 
Experimental studies of language development have 
the advantages of being of relatively short duration 
and of ensuring that, ~or comparative purposes, 
Language data from a large number of children are 
gathered. Since such studies o~ten focus on a small 
area of language, and can also be designed to 
incorporate statistical tests, their po~ularity among 
researchers has been considerable. Many reports based 
on such studies have appeared in reputable journals, 
especially the JCL. Quite frequently, published 
articles on various aspects of language development Cin 
the experimental mode> have given rise to profitable 
debates among researchers. In this sense, at least, 
these articles ~ave been of use : their publication has 
led to experimental researchers in different countries 
being able to compare their findings. The resulting 
incremental growth of knowledge in the field of 
language used by children in test situations has been 
considerable. But the point here is that such 
knowledge is essentially about language used in 
specific situations; situations which are not entirely 
natural. The main purpose of this thesis has been to 
argue that, because of their artificiality and because 
of certain inherent defects of method, experimental 
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tests of language development are, in general, poor 
yardsticks of LD. 
The main criticisms of experimental studies of LD 
are the following: 
1. The setting of these tests is an artificial one; 
t:hus no val 1-d conclusions can be reached regarding 
lang.uage development in a natur·al situation. 
2.. The use of strange apparatus by those involved in 
testing the children may distract the subjects or 
even produce anxiety. 
3. The mer·e presen:ce of an obse.r-ver serv,e.s to d·.tsto·r·.t 
the results of such experiments. 
4~ The duration of experiments can tend to produce 
boredom as well as exhaustion among subjects, 
resulting in stereotyped response patterns or even 
a lack of response. 
5. It appears that certain children choose to remain 
silent in an experimental situation rather than 
reveal what they may consider to be ignorance. 
This silence may itself be interpreted as a sign 
of ignorance by the interviewer. 
6. The materials used in some language development 
tests are at times poor models of the objects 
which they are intended to represent. This 
factor, coupled with the use of toys in tests of 
semantic development in particular, can lead to 
errors in reference. 
7. The language used in the construction of test 
items in experimental studies, and particularly 
the use of nonsense syllables, is often 
inappropriate and potentially confusing. 
Taken c.ollectively, the disadvantages of 
experimental studies of language development appear to 
outweigh the advantages. In the opening chapter. of 
this thesis, Chomsky was cited as classifying 
linguistics as part of cognitive psychology. Indeed, 
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in studying LD, one is conscious that only a part of 
the child's behaviour is under scrutiny. Language, 
however, meshes closely with other aspects of human 
behaviour, and it is questionable whether language per 
se can be abstracted ~rom the continuum of such 
behaviour for the purposes o~ research.. This is 
e.s·,sent·ia·lly what experimental researcher·s are trying to 
do. 
A number of stud.ies discussed in this thesis 
involve the child in activities which test factors 
other than language, such as memory and imagination. 
Linguistic competence is closely linked with the 
ability to recall, as well as with creativity. It is 
important that experimenters be a~are of these links 
when proceeding to draw conclusions from their 
research. Semantic development is but one of the many 
facets of child development. The growth of the child 
in associated areas of cognition should be taken into 
account when any assessment of semantic development is 
made. The overriding caveat to experimental 
researchers is to bear in mind that language is 
integrated into behaviour as a whole and cannot be 
isolated artificially for research purp~ses. 
In the case of naturalistic studies of LD, the 
main benefit is that the research takes place in a 
natural situation. Any conclusions which may be drawn 
from such studies are conclusions about normal language 
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i.e. language as it occurs in everyday situations~ The 
researcher or observer also enjoys the advantage of 
becoming relatively well-acquainted with the child. 
This knowledge of all aspects of the child is 
i.nvaluable in forming. judgments as to the degree of his 
language development. Furthermore, the value of 
keepi.ng records. of the· language of the child in two or 
more similar situations over a period of time is most 
important. Such observations provide the type of 
natural check on the precision of the data which a 
researcher obviously requires. 
Naturalistic studies have the further advantage of 
enabling data to be recorded at unusual times, such as 
when the child is talking in his sleep. Naturalistic 
studies also allow for important connections to be made 
between dramatic changes in the tempo of a child's LD 
and highly significant non-linguistic influences, such 
as separation from, or reunion with, a parent. 
Naturalistic studies are better able to relate LD to 
other important aspects of development, like memory and 
imagination. Knowledge of a child's overall social and 
cognitive development provides an essential framework 
for the study of LD. Naturalistic studi.es are able to 
achieve this overall perspective on child language. A 
far more holistic approach to the study of LD is 
achieved via naturalisti.c methods than by experimental 
ones. 
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Naturalistic methods are, however, not without 
certain drawbacks. They are usually very time-
consuming and make great demands on the energy of the 
researcher. The sheer volume of data which the child 
presents to the researcher can tend to become unwieldy 
and hence difficult to analyse. As Elliot <1981> 
correctly mentions: 
"Thus we face the major· f·rustr·ati on of the study 
of child language- just as the child begins to·make 
b:ig advances he becomes so voluble and his 1 anguage so 
varied that we have to turn to other means of 
collecting and organising our data" (1981:102>. 
In many instances of naturalistic observation of 
LD, the research is ca.r·r i ed out by a pa.r·ent of the 
child in question. This is not wholly desirable since 
a parent cannot be expected to be an impartial 
observer; on the other hand, a parent is usually 
dedicated to this type of research and will thus 
persevere in his or. her efforts. Another disadvantage 
of naturalistic studies is that they are often 
difficult to replicate. The age at which one child 
shows certain signs of development often differs 
considerably in the case of another child. The time 
available for the study of the LD of different children 
also varies. Thus it is unlikely that any two 
researchers would be able to confine their studies to 
children at the same <or a similar> stage of LD, for 
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the same period of time. 
Elliot (1981:102) explains that, when LD becomes 
rapid and is spread across a number of aspects of 
language at once, researchers become selective and tend 
to concentrate on specific areas. It is then that, 
El.liot c.laims, "most turn to experiments instead of 
naturalistic studies" <1981:1.02>. If it is the 
burgeoning growth in the amount and range of the 
child's language alone that inclines re~earchers 
towards experimental methods, this is very unfortunate. 
lt would seem that, in keeping with the general drift 
of this thesis, at this very stage more, and not less, 
reliance should be placed on naturalistic methods of 
research. Without doubt, this is difficult to achieve, 
ye.t it seems most desirable and cor·rect as a means of 
research. 
Research trends being what they are and bearing in 
mind that there will thus be a disinclination on the 
part of researchers into child language to avoid the 
use of experimental studies, despite their 
disadvantages as set out in this thesis, it is 
appropriate to examine ways in which such studies 
could be designed in order to achieve results of 
greater validity. At the same time, there will be an 
attempt to investigate ways of promoting more effective 
studies of language development in the naturalistic 
mode. These matters will now be discussed. 
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4. Recommendations for future research into language 
development, with respect to research method. 
In order for valid results to be obtained in any 
study of language development, it is the contention of 
this thesis that the language being studied should be 
natural in the sense that the. chi 1 d should not be 
placed in arti f·i ci al circumstances for the purposes of 
rese.arch. If the child is to be 'interviewed', then 
the approach should be as r·el a:<ed and as natural as 
possible. Audio-visual recording devices should be 
completely unobtrusive, and, if the interviewer needs 
to make notes, this should be done in a discreet 
manner. 
It is important that the child should feel at ease 
and not under pressure to 'perform well' for the sake 
of the interviewer. The reassuring approach employed 
by Armbuster (cf. Chapter Six> is to be recommended in 
this regard. 
The dur·ation of the period of such an 'interview' 
is important. : it generally depends on the age of the 
child<ren> in question, but flexibility is crucial. 
Elliot <1981:110> mentions a period of "about fifteen 
minutes". Periods longer than this lead to boredom or 
fatigue for many children, besides being of longer than 
normal duration in terms of what could be expected for 
most types of adult-child interaction. More 
importantly, interviews which are long tend to be 
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repetitive and thus artificial in their structure. It 
is preferable to keep the period short and extend it 
only if it is clear that the child is responding in a 
na·tural and reasonably fluent manner. Even for older· 
chi.l dren it. is recommended that such interviews should 
not last more than fif·teen minutes. It is better· to 
st·op. while· the child is still interested and enjoying 
the inter·acti on. It should be stressed, however, that 
such enjoyment should not be taken to mean excitement 
or obvious boisterousness. The child should not view 
the entire process as a game, but rather as a component 
of a normal conversation. 
Above all, the language used in interviews should 
be natural, lucid and economical. The use of 
"nonsense.-words" is questionable as a method of 
research into LO. Furthermore, if objects or props are 
used in such interviews, care should be taken to ensure 
that these, too, are natural. If toys are used then 
t.he researcher should refer to them as toys <or .as 
models) but not as the objects they represent. In all 
cases, the language used and the situations chosen 
should be as natural as possible. 
The researcher should concentrate on the 
linguistic: analysis of the data, and not on obtaining a 
corpus from a large number of children. Emphasis 
should lie on the quality of the language data, not on 
mere numbers of children iriterviewed. By giving 
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attention to smaller numbers of children for shorter 
periods of time, the researcher will be able to learn 
more about the LD of the child subjects by following up 
on initial interviews after a period of analysis of the 
data. In this way the research method will begin to 
approximate to that of the natural.istic mode. Its 
validity will therefore increase as well.. Seen purely 
~rom a statistical viewpoint, large samples are 
desirable in an experimental test situation. However, 
it would appear ~rom a reading o~ a number of articles 
in research journals, that the statistical facet is 
being overplayed to the detriment of linguistic 
analysis. 
The recommendation of thia thesis is that more 
care should be given to ensuring that the data itself 
is valid, by capturing such data in a natural 
situation, rather than giving undue attention to 
statistical requirements. 
The number of researchers employing naturalistic 
methods is no doubt very small. Nevertheless, such 
methods <although time-consuming> yield valid insights 
into the process of LD. In order for these insights to 
be made available to other researchers, it would seem 
desirable that an information network be set up among 
'naturalistic' researchers. In this way, similar 
findings in the field could be used for purposes of 
corroboration. It is also likely that a more co-
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ordinated research effort would result from such a 
research network, leading to a sharper focus on 
particular areas of research. No doubt the relative 
isolation of researchers using naturalistic methods has 
led to their studies becoming dif~use. It would be 
inter-esting t·o eHamine the effect of attempting to fuse 
t·he· various strands of· research in the naturalistic 
mode. 
Another recommendation that is directed to 
'naturalistic' researchers is that they should provide 
more detailed research records, showing the exact ages 
at which their subjects made important utterances or 
achieved apparent 'milestones' in LD. These records 
should be specific as to the age in years, months and 
days of the child(ren) being studied. The advent of 
the micro-computer has made possible the sc;:~rting of a 
large quantity o~ information. One of the sorting 
devices avaiLable is that of collation according to 
age. This approach ought to be valuable, especially 
when used to compare one's finpings to those'of others. 
Another useful method of sorting is to collect 
utterances of a similar kind made at different ages. 
Examples o~ this are found at the end of Kaper <1985). 
Even Kaper's method of data presentation could be 
improved by a sub-division into more refined 
categories, e.g. locatives, temporal adverbs, container 
words and antonyms. In this respect, the detailed 
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index of research articles given in the JCL, Volume 12 
has proved extremely useful for the purposes of the 
cur· rent thesis. 
A more general comment, therefore, directed at 
research into LD, would be that there is currently a 
lack o+ organisation o4 research findings in the 
There has been an explosion of information 
in recent years without a commensurate increase in 
knowledge. It is suggested that inadequate filing and 
sorting of information is one o.f the key reasons for 
this disparity. Just as researchers need to organise 
and analyse a plethora of _data which child subjects 
present, so is there a need for the -findings of 
individual. researchers to be gathered and sorted into 
useful categories. In this way, being able to 
distinguish the salient similarities among various 
~indings, future researchers ought to be able to 
consolidate the work of their predecessors. 
5. Implications of the findings of this thesis for the 
study of semantics 
The main conclusions and recommendations of this 
thesis, as set out in the first four parts of this 
chapter, require a final perspective. They need to be 
seen in relation to the study of semantics as a whole. 
The concluding section of this thesis will therefore 
contain remarks on the implications of these findings 
for the study of semantics. 
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Some of the more important questions to be 
addressed are the following: 
1. To what extent does the study of semantics in child 
language differ from the study of semantics in adult 
language'? 
2~ Bearing in mind the point raised in question 1 above, 
is it valid to make a distinction between child 
language and adul.t language? 
3. Is t·here such a thing <entity> as semantic competence? 
4. To what extent is the study of semantics, in general, a 
profitable one'? 
The above questions are interdependent, so that, 
rather than attempting to answer them separately, it 
will be attempted to address them holistically. 
In the introduction to The Articulate Mammal, 
Aitchison <1976:13> submits that "child language" 
overlaps with the "language of normal adults" : she 
does so by means of the following series of diagrams: 
Fig. 4 (1976:13) 
The area of overlap of the two central sets is 
designated as the "language of 8-14 year olds". This 
implies a gradation : a phasing-out of child language 
and a phasing-in of adult language. This model seems 
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more appropriate than one which views the change from 
child to adult language as an overnight, radical one. 
However, it ought to be stressed that, despite 
di~ferences in external forms, child and adult language 
are more alike than different. This point was made by 
•<aper and is one that is endor·sed by the author. Both 
ch~ld and adult are members of the species homo sapiens 
and ought therefore to possess language in the broader 
sense, as de~ined by Hockett <1963> and by Aitchison 
( 1976: 36-43). It would therefore seem more appropriate 
to refer to child language as 'developing language' 
it is not the same <or not quite the same> as the 
language used by adults because children are 
biologically and in terms of experience, less developed 
than adults. 
Phonetic and phonological development is more 
clearly defined and more rapid than semantic 
development <cf. Menyuk <1971> for evidence in support 
of this statement>. A similar comparison can be drawn 
between syntactic and semantic development. That this 
should be so is a corollary of the fact that the number 
of permissible sounds and sentence contructions in a 
language are both far fewer than the number of possible 
words <and hence potential meanings) in that language. 
Semantics is thus a far more problematic area of study 
than either phonology or syntax. Semantics is further 
complicated by the ongoing debate concerning certain 
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key concepts in the subject, such as meaning, 
reference, singular terms and proper names. 
Disagreement among linguists in the latter 
respects makes the study of semant i.cs in relation to 
developing language correspondingly more difficult : 
not only is it unclear wha~ children mean; it is also 
in dispute as to whe~her it is possible to ascertain 
what they mean, or what adults mean, for that matter. 
A fert·i 1 e re.search area could well be the study of 
differences in the degree of metalinguistic awareness 
exhibited by adults and children.. One of the time 
scales for the development of metalinguistic awareness 
cited in the literature <Tunmer et al, 1984:28> is "the 
period from approximately 4 tq 8 years of age". If 
children's linguistic development bears a definite 
relationship to their development of metalinguistic 
awareness, then researchers studying the semantic 
development of childr·en ought to be able to obtain a 
more accurate id~a of this developmental aspect by 
comparing it with the extent to which there is an 
awareness of language as an object of thought. 
One might then attempt a rather broad <or general> 












Fi.g •. 5 
The firs.t set would corr·e.spond to children aged zer·o to 
six and. the second, to children aged four to fourteen. 
One of· the main points to c.onsi der in the study of the 
languag.e of children, therefore, is the extent, .or 
degree, of t·hei r awareness of 1 anguage as an object of 
thought. The degree of metalinguistic awareness of a 
chi 1 d subject waul d appear to have a material i nf 1 Lienee 
on the way in which he 'performs' in a language test. 
A child who is able to think deliberately about 
concepts like synonymity o~ ambiguity, for instance, 
would appear to possess a greater degree of semantic 
competence than one who is less aware of these 
concepts. However, a similar criterion could be 
applied to adult subjects. 
It also appears reasonable to assume that certain 
adults possess clearer ideas of concepts like ambiguity 
and synonymity than others. Certain adults are said to 
'possess a good vocabulary' because they are able to 
express their thoughts more precisely than their 
fellows, using a wider range of lexical items. Such an 
ability is not necessarily advantageous in all 
situations : its merit would appear to be the greatest 
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when these adults are in the company of others of like 
ability. 
Never·theless, semantic competence is not an 
abs·olute concept : users of a 1 anguage ar'e ab 1 e to 
acquire new lexical items throughout their lifetimes, 
as well as be.ing able to improve on their choice of 
words in a particul.ar communicative situation. In the 
case of children acquiring a language, and ~hus moving 
gradually towards <some sort of> semantic competence, 
the key pr'Obl em is the meshing ·of concepts with 
linguistic structures. As Schlesinger <1981:239> puts 
it, "the child must find out how the multi-dimensional 
cognitive space is mapped into language-specific 
semantic categories". This is a broader, or more 
general, description of the process to which Slobin 
(1981:197) refers as the pairing of "prototypical event 
and canonical form". 
For the adult,the greater number of events are no 
longer prototypical, and linguistic forms to describe 
these events are relatively stereotyped. In this 
respect, the language of adults is more developed than 
that of children. However, novel events <e.g.the 
discovery of a new technology like laser optics> result 
in adults having to link these <prototypical> events 
with new lexical items. Unlike the child, the adult is 
able to slot the new concepts (and new le~ical items> 




Initially, some adults experience more problems 
than others in coping with what is essentially a re-
structuring of their systems of concepts and language. 
But the 'elasticity' of the semantic component of 
ianguage ensures that such changes are accommodated. 
More.over, the, reality and the useful ness of the changes 
is an incentive for their accomplishment. The study of 
how such 'innovations' enter adult linguistic systems 
would appear to be a fruitful one, especially in the • 
light of the concept of "future shock". An improved 
semantic analysis of the plethora of new lexical items 
that enter language via changing technology and life-
styles is not l.ikely to cushion the mental discomfort 
which often accompanies such changes. What it may 
achieve, however, is an improved insight into human 
mechanisms o~ coping with change. 
In a sense, this study is similar to the study of 
ho~ children, in a relatively short time, absorb a vast 
number of lexical items into their developing language. 
Both child and adult are faced with changes in their 
environment. Changes in language mirror environmental 
change.s as well as human reactions thereto. In the 
final analysis, there seems to be much merit in viewing 
child and adult language as essentially similar. 
Semantic development can thus be viewed as a component 
of overall human development. The study of the 
developing language of children ought thus to shed 
light on the <still) developing language of adults. 
There will always be an area of overlap in the study of 
the semantics of the language of members of different 
ag.e groups. 
Although the subject of semantics is opaque and 
pre.se.nts its students with a series of controversies, 
it is nevertheless worthy of study for it enlightens 
our understanding of humanity. Humans, whether 
children or adults, use language to ~· F'r·ecisely 
because people change in response to both internal and 
external forces, their language, and hence what they 
mean, will remain a dynamic entity. For this reason 
alone, the study of semantics should be pursued. The 
study of semantic ,je~'elop'l»ent is an inalienable and 
i.mportant part of this overall pursuit. 
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